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The Political Theory of Treaties in the Restatements
of Foreign Relations Law
John T. Parry*
What is a treaty? What purposes does it serve? Who negotiates or
ratifies it? What impact does it have on the powers, obligations, or
laws of a signatory country? Treaties are legal documents, and these
questions raise legal issues to which international and domestic law
provide answers. 1 But these questions also raise basic issues about
how states organize themselves internally, how they interact with
each other, and how they conceptualize these processes. Thus, the
act of making, complying with, or breaking a treaty is also a political
act, and the significance of these political actions varies across time
and space in ways that interact with theories about the nature of
political life and political organization.
One ought to be able to trace, therefore, the links over time
between the discourse of treaties and the discourse of political
2
theory. The ways in which prevailing political theories conceive of

* Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. My thanks to
David Moore for inviting me to take part in this symposium and to the editors of the BYU
Law Review for their close reading and helpful comments. Many of the arguments that I make
in this article are tentative, and I welcome comments.
1. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. VI, cl. 2;
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Note that my
use of the word “treaty” in this article displays some slippage. In the early parts of this article,
“treaty” is a broad term that sometimes achieves near symmetry with “international
agreement” or “promise.” By the end of the article, however, “treaty” has essentially the same
meaning as it has in American constitutional law.
2. I use the term “political theory” to refer to more than the organized ideas
articulated in the work of writers such as (to cite an intentionally disparate group of EuroAmerican theorists) Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Karl Marx, Carl Schmitt, John Rawls,
Michael Walzer, or Stephen Holmes. I intend also to include arguably less sophisticated
attempts to sort out political life and political organization, including theories that can be
inferred from political practices. Further, implicit in my claim of a relationship between
political theory and treaties is the assertion that much of political life is about structuring
individual and collective existence over time and in the face of uncertainty. Treaties, therefore,
are central to political life because they represent a plan or hope for the future. Any theory of
treaties is also, at least in part, a theory of politics, and any theory of politics must generate a
corresponding theory of treaties.
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treaties provide a useful vantage point for understanding treaty law
but also for assessing the underlying goals and commitments of those
theories. Similarly, the ways in which the law of treaties makes
assumptions about political relationships provide a useful vantage
point for evaluating, not only the law of treaties, but also the relative
strength of various approaches to political life and organization.
Thus, the effort to connect treaties and political theory demonstrates
not just the impact of political theory on treaties but also the impact
of treaties on political theory.
This Article provides three broad sketches of the connections
between treaties and the larger goals or concerns of political theory
over time. The first sketch considers treaties in early modern Europe.
The second addresses the founding era of the United States. The
third surveys the ways that the Restatements of Foreign Relations
Law have addressed treaties and considers the extent to which the
Restatements reflect the concerns that animated debates about
treaties in the early modern and founding periods. Each Restatement
has taken a slightly different approach to the legal status of treaties
and to the relative powers of the branches of the federal government
with respect to treaties. These differences also demonstrate distinct
approaches to the interactions of international law and international
society with forms of democratic government generally and with the
U.S. political system specifically.
I. POLITICAL THEORY AND TREATIES IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE
“During the [European] Middle Ages, international or universal
law merged with ecclesiastical law, and even positive treaty law was
considered to have legal force only because treaties were confirmed
by oath, which, ‘being a “sacrament,” subjected the obligation
incurred to the jurisdiction of the Church.’” 3 This way of thinking
about the nature and role of treaties was part of a political discourse
that de-emphasized the importance of states and stressed the
sovereignty of God. In this strongly hierarchical view, “[t]he idea of
final authority was natural to the Church, as God was the authority:
3. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2604–05 (1997) (quoting ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS 24 (1947)); see also MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (5th ed. 2008)
(“In earlier centuries, the obligatory force of treaties could be attributed to
religious solemnities.”).
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his status was expressed on earth through the rival claims of the pope
and the Holy Roman Emperor to represent him.” 4
Over time, however, “as both the pope and the Emperor lost
power, the authority of other monarchs such as the kings of England
and France increased to the point that . . . a multi-state system
existed.” 5 More than one state sought to claim for itself the mantle
of hegemonic authority in Europe, even as authority effectively
became localized in some parts of Europe, and papal claims receded
with the political success of protestant faiths. The system that
ultimately emerged was dominated by independent and nominally
equal sovereign states.
Many commentators use the two treaties that constituted the
Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and ended the Thirty Years War as a
rough placeholder for the emergence of a sovereign state system. 6
That assertion, however, is problematic for multiple reasons,
including the fact that it has little to do with what the treaties
actually purported to accomplish.

4. Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty, 21
INT’L HIST. REV. 569, 571 (1999); see also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW:
HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 19–23 (2004) (discussing religious authority, oaths, and the
tensions among popes and other rulers in the medieval period).
5. Croxton, supra note 4, at 571. For a good discussion of the forces that drove those
changes, with a stress on the importance of religious disputes, see DANIEL H. NEXON, THE
STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE: RELIGIOUS CONFLICT, DYNASTIC
EMPIRES, AND INTERNATIONAL CHANGE (2009). Note that the shift in power from popes and
emperors towards other monarchs did not mean that claims of religious authority immediately
became irrelevant in the years before and after the Thirty Years War. See JACQUES-BENIGNE
BOSSUET, POLITICS DRAWN FROM THE VERY WORDS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE 58 (Patrick Riley
ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1990) (1709) (“[P]rinces act as ministers of God, and his
lieutenants on earth. . . . It is in this way that we have seen that the royal throne is not the
throne of a man, but the throne of God himself. . . . It appears from all this that the person of
kings is sacred, and that to attempt anything against them is a sacrilege.”); KING JAMES VI & I,
Basilicon Doron, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 1, 20 (Johann P. Sommerville ed., 1994) (stating
that “a lawfull good King” “acknowledgeth himselfe ordained for his people, hauing receiued
from God a burthen of gouernment, whereof he must be countable”); KING JAMES VI & I,
The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 62, 64 (Johann P. Sommerville ed.,
1994) (“Kings are called Gods . . . because they sit vpon GOD his Throne in the earth, and
haue the count of their administration to giue vnto him.”).
6. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 3, at 2607 (“In 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia ended the
Thirty Years War by acknowledging the sovereign authority of various European princes. This
event marked the advent of traditional international law, based on principles of territoriality
and state autonomy.”).
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Put in terms of this essay’s focus, the political theory of the Peace
of Westphalia does not presuppose a society of independent and
equal sovereigns. To the contrary, it continues to reflect a system in
which multiple strands of authority operated and overlapped to
create numerous kinds of political relationships among emperor,
kings, other rulers, religious leaders, cities, regions, and individuals. 7
Nonetheless, that multifarious system had long been under strain
because of, among other things, the continuing development of
ideas about sovereignty. 8 The Peace of Westphalia was later
reconceived (and was capable of being reconceived) to fit within the
political theory and conceptions of treaty law that became common
sense well after 1648. 9 Westphalia has thus become an origin story,
in part because of what it actually accomplished, in part because of
the actual political theory or understanding of political relationships
that was at work, but in larger part because of the utility of that story
for later generations of Europeans.
Notably, in the century or so before Westphalia, writers in
political theory and international law provided important but also
diverging blueprints for what became the new European political
system. For example, Harold Koh has highlighted the efforts of
Francisco Suárez, Alberico Gentili, and Hugo Grotius to separate
international law from divine law and even, to some extent, from
natural law (or at least from natural law conceived of as a reflection
of divine will). 10
7. For discussions of the difficulties of assigning the emergence of the European
system of independent sovereign states to the Peace of Westphalia, see, for example, Croxton,
supra note 4; Randall Lesaffer, The Westphalia Peace Treaties and the Development of the
Tradition of Great European Peace Settlements Prior to 1648, 18 GROTIANA 71 (1997);
NEXON, supra note 5, at 265–88.
8. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 3, at 2606 (noting the importance of Bodin’s publication
in 1576 of a “general theory of the state that gave rise to the modern concept of sovereignty as
a driving force in international law”); RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE:
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 83–85, 96
(1999) (discussing Grotius’s theory of sovereignty).
9. See DAVID ARMITAGE, FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT 9–
12, 27–28 (2013); NEXON, supra note 5, at 286 (“[M]any of the arguments in favor of the
Westphalian hypothesis depend on developments in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
European political practices.”).
10. See Koh, supra note 3, at 2606 (stating that Suárez “introduced the notion of the
customary practice of nations as an important supplementary source of rules in international
law,” Gentili “became ‘perhaps the first writer to make a definite separation of international
law from theology and ethics and to treat it as a branch of jurisprudence,’” and Grotius “was
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In particular, Grotius posited a “minimalist” conception of
natural law, which freed individuals and states to act in their own
self-interest. 11 But, however minimalist Grotius’s conception of
natural law may have been, he developed clear rules about the
conduct of individuals and states. First, the natural law rules that
bind individuals in the state of nature also govern the conduct of
states and rulers. 12 Second, promises are important: “[T]he fulfilling
of Covenants belongs to the Law of Nature.” 13 Third, individuals
have a natural law obligation to keep their contracts, 14 and the same
basic rule applies to states. Although Grotius’s discussion of treaties
in The Rights of War and Peace is extensive, the gist of it is, as Hersch
Lauterpacht summarized, that “the binding force of treaties is the
basis of international law. They must be kept even in relation to
pirates and tyrants, in peace or in war; they may be made, according
to the Christian law and otherwise, with infidels, and faith must be
kept even with them.” 15

the first writer to express jus gentium not simply as natural law, derived from right reason, but
as the consequence of volitional acts, generated by independent operation of the human will”)
(citations omitted); see also 2 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN
POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE AGE OF REFORMATION 154 (1978) (“[T]here is no doubt that by
the end of the sixteenth century, due to the progressive refinement of the underlying idea that
the law of nations is simply an aspect of positive human law, the later Jesuit theorists were able
to bequeath to Grotius and his successors a recognisable analysis of international law as a
special code of positive law founded on the principles of natural justice.”) (citation omitted);
TUCK, supra note 8, at 78–108 (providing detailed analysis of Grotius’s writings on political
theory, natural law, and international law). For my assessment of Grotius, particularly with
respect to the role and content of natural law, see John T. Parry, What is the Grotian Tradition
in International Law?, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 299, 363–66 (2013).
11. See Parry, supra note 10, at 359–60, 364–65, and sources cited therein.
12. See TUCK, supra note 8, at 84–85, 95–96.
13. 1 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 93 (Richard Tuck ed., 2005)
(1625); see also id. (“And the Mother of Civil Law is that very Obligation which arises from
Consent, which deriving its Force from the Law of Nature, Nature may be called as it were,
the Great Grandmother of this Law also.”); 3 id., Prolegomena to the First Edition, at 1749
(Richard Tuck trans.) (stating that “it is part of the ius naturae that we keep our promises”
and that “the mother of civil law is the obligation which arises from agreement, and since that
gets its force from natural law, nature can be termed the grandmother of civil law”).
14. 2 GROTIUS, supra note 13, at 704–05.
15. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 1, 42 (1946) (citing numerous sections of The Rights of War and Peace); see also
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL
CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS 20 (2013) (describing pacta sunt servanda as
“the grund norm of modern international law”).
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Fourth, Grotius’s stress on the importance of treaty promises
includes the assertion that an unequal treaty, or a treaty that one
party entered into out of fear, is just as legitimate as a treaty entered
into by equal and willing parties. For Grotius, fear, coercion, and
inequality had no impact on the binding quality of promises or on
16
the shared obligations of the parties to keep their promises.
Grotius also posited that humans are naturally self-interested and
naturally sociable, 17 and the obligation to keep promises mediates
between these two natural instincts. Because states are conceptually
the same as individuals under this highly structured framework, and
because the creation of states derived, at least conceptually, from
agreements among individuals, 18 Grotius’s theory is also a theory of
political life and political relationships. For Grotius, states interacted
according to the same impulses and natural law rules as individuals,
which meant that treaties played an important and powerful role in
international society 19—not because of divine approval or the threat
of divine justice, but because the natural order of human relations
required that they do so. With some important modifications,
Grotius’s approach fit well with the state system that was continuing
to emerge in Europe. 20
Writing in 1758, a century after Westphalia, Emer de Vattel
followed Grotius to the extent that he derived initial rules of
international law from the natural law rules that apply to

16. See 2 GROTIUS, supra note 13, at 712 (“[H]e who through Fear has promised any
Thing, is obliged to perform it, because his Consent here was absolute, and not conditional, as
in the Case of an Error.”); see also id. at 823–27 (discussing equal and unequal conventions).
17. For the relationship between self-interest and sociability in Grotius’s writings, see
Parry, supra note 10, at 328–30, 351–57.
18. See 1 GROTIUS, supra note 13, at 338.
19. See Koh, supra note 3, at 2606 ("Grotius posited the notion of what has become
known as ‘international society,’ a community of those participating in the international legal
order, whose fabric was interwoven with international law.”).
20. Grotius’s views on sovereignty, for example, were complex and allowed for less (or
more) than the unitary political authority of a state over specific territory. See LAUREN
BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN THE EUROPEAN EMPIRES,
1400–1900 132 (2010) (observing, in the context of the law of the sea, that “Grotius in fact
suggested that degrees of sovereignty and multiple spatial relations of sovereignty were integral
to empire”); see also Parry, supra note 10, at 344 n.214 (discussing debate over Grotius’s
approach to sovereignty in theory and practice). Benton suggests that Grotius’s views “would
have been very familiar . . . to late medieval commentators.” BENTON, supra, at 133.
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individuals. 21 Vattel wrote that a state is “a moral person,” and
“nations or sovereign states are to be considered as so many free
persons living together in the state of nature” such that “the law of
nations is originally no other than the law of nature applied to
nations.” 22 And, again similar to individuals in the state of nature,
every state is “free and independent of all the others,” and “a perfect
equality prevails in their rights and obligations.” 23 One of the
essential components of this system was binding treaties. As had
Grotius, Vattel began with the promises of individuals: “he who has
made a promise to any one, has conferred upon him a real right to
require the thing promised,” and only by keeping promises can
people live together in “tranquillity,” “happiness,” and “security.” 24
What holds for individuals also holds for states:
This obligation is then as necessary, as it is natural and indubitable,
between nations that live together in a state of nature, and
acknowledge no superior upon earth, to maintain order and peace
in their society. Nations, therefore, and their conductors, ought
inviolably to observe their promises and their treaties. 25

A state that violates a treaty “violates at the same time the law
of nations.” 26
Yet, Vattel’s conception of treaties departed in important respects
from that of Grotius. Individuals and states were both “persons,” but
Vattel stressed the “very different obligations and rights” that result

21. For Vattel’s explanation of his differences with Grotius over natural law, see EMER
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 7–8 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., 2008). For
additional discussion of their differences, see infra notes 27–32 and accompanying text. See
also MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 112–21 (2005) (providing a good overview of Vattel and
his differences from earlier writers).
22. VATTEL, supra note 21, at 67–68. Critically, as the quotation indicates, Vattel
contended that the law of nature was simply the starting point for the law of nations. See id. at
14–17, 76–78 (discussing the voluntary, conventional, and customary law of nations and
distinguishing them from the necessary law of nations).
23. Id. at 71, 75.
24. Id. at 342.
25. Id. at 343; see also id. at 387 (“The faith of treaties,—that firm and sincere
resolution,—that invariable constancy in fulfilling our engagements,—of which we make
profession in a treaty, is therefore to be held sacred and inviolable between the nations of the
earth, whose safety and repose it secures . . . .”).
26. Id. at 387.
DE
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from applying natural law to their distinct circumstances. 27 The nature
of states, and the importance of their formal equality and sovereignty,
led Vattel to impose greater natural law restrictions than had Grotius
on the use of unequal treaties. 28 He also stressed the importance of
“balance of power” in Europe. 29 Further, to the extent treaties acquire
their binding force from natural law, the constraint imposed comes
only from “the law of conscience”; a “free and independent” state is in
most instances accountable only to itself. 30
Vattel’s system of equality among nations in a state of nature,
bound in conscience by natural law and the positive law of nations,
evidences a theory of political organization founded on independent
sovereign authority but which seeks for stability and which
accommodates self-interest while encouraging cooperation. Treaties,
in this scheme, are critical, but their reach is confined by principles of
justice, which includes “the justice which provides for state
freedom.” 31 Under this scheme, states have significantly greater
room to maneuver within their treaty obligations than they do under
Grotius’s system. Further, while the state and the individual are both
moral persons, the state ultimately has an entirely different status
32
that allows it to act independently of natural law constraints.
Well before Grotius and Vattel, another writer articulated a
different approach to political relationships and treaties. Niccolò
27. Id. at 68–69; see also id. at 10–12 (making the same point).
28. See id. at 349–55. For a useful discussion, see KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 21, at 117–18.
29. VATTEL, supra note 21, at 353; see also id. at 496–99 (stressing the importance to
Europe of “balance” or “equilibrium”).
30. Id. at 71; see also id. (“Nations being free and independent,—though the conduct
of one of them be illegal and condemnable by the laws of conscience, the others are bound to
acquiesce in it, when it does not infringe upon their perfect rights. The liberty of that nation
would not remain entire, if the others were to arrogate to themselves the right of inspecting
and regulating her actions;—an assumption on their part, that would be contrary to the law of
nature, which declares every nation free and independent of all the others.”).
31. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 21, at 117 n.198. Koskenniemi suggests that, under
Vattel’s approach, “the risk arises that the State remains bound only if that is what it wills.” Id.
at 117; see also Brian Richardson, The Use of Vattel in the American Law of Nations, 106 AM. J.
INT’L L. 547, 550–53 (2012) (discussing Vattel’s approach to international law, with stress on
his conception of voluntary law and the limits of treaties).
32. This concept of the state was also consistent with a form of raison d’état, both
domestically in the form of the police power and the art of governing, and internationally in
the relations among European states. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY,
TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1977–1978 (Michel
Senellart et al. eds., Graham Burchell trans., 2007).

1588

5.PARRY.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1581

5/6/2016 7:37 AM

The Political Theory of Treaties

Machiavelli declared in The Prince that, although “[e]veryone knows
how praiseworthy it is for a ruler to keep his promises,”
“[n]evertheless, experience shows that in our times the rulers who
have done great things are those who have set little store by keeping
their word, being skilful rather in cunningly confusing men.” 33 He
explained that “there are two ways of contending: one by using laws,
the other, force. The first is appropriate for men, the second for
animals; but because the former is often ineffective, one must have
recourse to the latter.” 34 Thus, Machiavelli asserted,
[A] prudent ruler cannot keep his word, nor should he, when such
fidelity would damage him, and when the reasons that made him
promise are no longer relevant. This advice would not be sound if
all men were all upright; but because they are treacherous and
would not keep their promises to you, you should not consider
yourself bound to keep your promises to them. 35

Writing in the Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli was more
measured, stating,
I believe furthermore that agreements made by force will never be
observed either by a prince or by a republic; I believe that when the fear
of losing the state arises, both kinds of government will break faith with
you and will treat you with ingratitude in order to avoid losing it.36

Further, “it is not shameful to avoid keeping those promises you
were constrained to make by force; for promises exacted by force
that regard the state are always broken when the force is removed,
and they are broken without shame on the part of the one who
breaks them.” 37
The passage from The Prince is, of course, familiar as a key
textual example of Machiavellianism, raison d’état, or, sometimes,

33. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 61 (Quentin Skinner & Russell Price eds.,
1988) (1532).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 61–62.
36. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON LIVY 145 (Julia Conaway Bondanella &
Peter Bondanella trans., 1997) (1531).
37. Id. at 351; see also id. (“Not only are promises exacted by force never kept between
princes, when the force is removed, but no other promises are observed when the causes for
them are removed.”).
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realism, when that word is used as an epithet. 38 The denial of any
obligation to abide by a treaty is not a strong foundation for a theory
of politics in which treaty commitments, let alone an international
law based on keeping treaty promises, play a strong role. Despite
some overlap in their views on treaty promises, therefore, Machiavelli
and Vattel situated those views in very different approaches to
politics. And, in fact, these passages from Machiavelli’s writings go
well beyond what Vattel was willing to countenance from “free and
independent” sovereigns who, though bound only in conscience by
natural law to keep their promises, were charged with maintaining
stability and balance of power.
At the same time, however, Machiavelli recognized the
importance and, arguably, even the moral superiority of keeping
promises despite his insistence that an effective ruler must feel free to
break them. 39 Note, too, that the discussion in the Discourses focuses
on situations in which the survival of the state was at issue and on
treaty promises extracted by force. Whatever one’s ultimate views
about such situations, they present difficult questions for any
government or theorist. Further, Machiavelli asserted that a republic
was more likely to keep its treaty promises than was a prince, 40 and
there is no doubt that Machiavelli had a clear preference for
republican government. 41

38. See Lauterpacht, supra note 15, at 24–25 (using Machiavelli’s purported views as an
example of “the typical realistic approach of contempt towards the ‘little breed’ of man”).
Whether it is fair, however, to equate Machiavelli’s thought with the state- and governancecentered complexities of raison d’état (which itself is not synonymous with realism), is far from
clear. See Foucault, supra note 32, at 242–45.
39. Commentators have debated exactly what Machiavelli thought about the virtues—
such as keeping promises—that other writers of his era had insisted upon for rulers. See, e.g.,
J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 156–57, 172 (1975); 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE RENAISSANCE 134–37 (1978).
40. MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES, supra note 36, at 146. In part, the reason Machiavelli
gave was that republics take longer to reach a decision, but he also asserted that “the people
commit less serious errors than the prince” and are therefore more trustworthy. Id. at 146–47.
Thus, “it is possible to cite examples where the smallest advantage has caused a prince to break
his word, but where even an enormous advantage has not caused a republic to break its word.”
Id. at 146.
41. See POCOCK, supra note 39, at 196–203 (arguing Machiavelli linked an aristocratic
republic with stability but favored “the participation of the many in citizenship” because
stability was ultimately impossible and a broad-based, militarized “active virtù” created a
better republic); SKINNER, supra note 39, at 159 (asserting Machiavelli “is in fact a consistent
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Machiavelli’s political theory assumes fluidity and danger in
relations among states, such that the political viability of the state is
always at risk. In this kind of perpetual crisis, the short term view
dominates. To achieve stability or security, political leaders must do
what is necessary; they must take the initiative, attack first, and be
willing to break rules and promises. Sovereignty is less a theory or a
foundation than it is an ongoing contest. Countries or cities should
assume that they must fend for themselves, that they should expect
trouble, and that they ultimately will fail and lose their
political independence. 42
Thus, the question Machiavelli addressed was whether a focus on
the political context of a treaty promise leads to different results than
an approach that equates the moral and legal obligations of states
and natural persons. Grotius claimed there was no difference. Vattel
saw some difference, perhaps of degree. Machiavelli—writing much
earlier—saw a difference of kind. While a private person might have
to keep promises, Machiavelli denied that it was honorable for a
political leader, charged with preserving or enhancing the security of

and even a fervent partisan of popular government” and that “his general attitude in the
Discourses towards any form of monarchical government is one of marked hostility”).
Commentators disagree, however, about many aspects of Machiavelli’s republicanism and its
legacy. See, e.g., Paul A. Rahe, Machiavelli’s Liberal Republican Legacy, in MACHIAVELLI’S
LIBERAL REPUBLICAN LEGACY xix, xxi (Paul A. Rahe ed., 2006) (“The contributors to this
book . . . are united as well in regarding Pocock’s depiction of Machiavelli’s understanding of
republicanism as highly misleading . . . [and] are convinced that Machiavelli’s republican legacy
is . . . quite complex.”); VICKIE B. SULLIVAN, MACHIAVELLI, HOBBES, AND THE FORMATION
OF LIBERAL REPUBLICANISM IN ENGLAND 22–26 (2004) (arguing Pocock and Skinner
incorrectly portray Machiavelli as transmitting a form of classical republicanism that was
inconsistent with liberalism).
42. See POCOCK, supra note 39, at 156–57, 165–66, 177, 184–85; SKINNER, supra
note 39, at 113–15, 125–26, 134–37, 156–57; SULLIVAN, supra note 41, at 35–37, 78–79.
Arguably, then, Machiavelli was a dystopian theorist—but perhaps, depending on one’s
perspective, the same could be said of Grotius and Vattel. Grotius developed his insistence on
the sanctity of treaties, even if unequal, to serve the purposes of Dutch colonialism. See Parry,
supra note 10, at 337–41. Thus, the idea that forms “the basis of international law,” see
Lauterpacht, supra note 15, at 42, is also an instrument of repression and exploitation. See
ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
67–82 (2004) (focusing on treaties, particularly unequal treaties in the context of colonialism
and positivist approaches to international law); see also ARMITAGE, supra note 9, at 125
(discussing Vattel’s approval of colonization in North America); TUCK, supra note 8, at 195
(same). Machiavelli’s approach might make far more sense, at least descriptively, than would
the approaches of Grotius or Vattel to those at the other end of colonialism and
unequal treaties.
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the republic, to impose any burden on or forego any advantage to
the state simply because of a treaty promise. For all three, their
conception of the state was directly linked to their ideas about
political life and the nature of treaties.
As is no doubt obvious to readers, the views of Grotius, Vattel,
and Machiavelli have been influential, and they continue to resonate
in contemporary debates about international law and
international relations. 43
II. POLITICAL THEORIES OF TREATIES IN THE AMERICAN
FOUNDING ERA
Vattel recognized that a state’s internal organization is relevant
to the law of treaties:
[A]ll rulers of states have not a power to make public treaties by
their own authority alone: some are obliged to take the advice of a
senate, or of the representatives of the nation. It is from the
fundamental laws of each state that we must learn where resides the
authority that is capable of contracting with validity in the name of
the state. 44

This passage hints at the complications created by republican,
democratic, or federal forms of political organization. The years
during and after the founding of the United States make plain the

43. See, e.g., MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 2–6,
36–37 (2008) (using Grotius and Machiavelli to organize a discussion about competing views
on compliance with international law, and assigning Vattel a more ambiguous role); see also
Parry, supra note 10, at 306–23; infra note 49. There are, of course, other important writers
from the early modern period whom I do not discuss. For example, Pufendorf distinguished
among moral theology, natural law, and civil law. See SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF
MAN AND CITIZEN 7 (James Tully ed., 1991) (1673). He asserted there is no independent law
of nations; it is either natural law or the civil law of particular countries. See SAMUEL
PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS, bk. II, ch. III, XXIII, at 149–50
(Carew trans. 1729) (1672). Like Grotius, he wrote that natural law requires “keeping faith”
with contracts and promises, including treaties. See id. at 152; id. bk. III, ch. IV, II, at 252–53.
Unlike Grotius, and like Vattel (and consistent on this issue with Machiavelli), he made an
exception for contracts and treaties made because of fear, where the other party to the
obligation was the cause of the fear. See id. ch. VI, X, at 277–78; id. bk. VIII, ch. VIII, I, at
854. For more discussion of Pufendorf, particularly in relation to Grotius (and Hobbes), see
TUCK, supra note 8, at 140–65.
44. VATTEL, supra note 21, at 338–39.
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issues that democratic political theory creates for the adoption and
implementation of treaties.
The federal government under the Articles of Confederation
lacked the power to force states to comply with treaties, including
the 1783 Treaty of Paris between Great Britain and the United
States. 45 This federalism issue about the legal status and practical
enforceability of treaties helped crystallize the efforts to amend the
Articles and later to develop an entirely new system of government. 46
Going further, to many participants in founding-era political debates,
“a core purpose of American constitution-making was to facilitate
the admission of the United States into the European-based system
of sovereign states governed by the law of nations.” 47 Participants in
these debates often were familiar with writers such as Grotius and
Vattel. 48 Through more circuitous and contested routes, many were
also influenced by Machiavelli’s analysis of republics and of politics
in general. 49

45. See John T. Parry, Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of
Treaties, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1209, 1218 (2009).
46. See id. at 1218–19 (discussing efforts to amend the Articles); David M. Golove &
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law of
Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 934–35 (2010);
David H. Moore, Constitutional Commitment to International Law Compliance?, 102 VA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 5, 54–55) (on file with author).
47. Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 46, at 935. Golove and Hulsebosch present this
statement in a more sweeping sense, as an accurate description of what the Constitution was
for. See id. Although I agree this was one of the Constitution’s purposes at a general level, my
use of the quotation suggests all was not as monolithic as they would wish. For another useful
overview of this period, see David L. Sloss et al., International Law in the Supreme Court to
1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 7,
9–12 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011).
48. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 31, at 548, 560, 570–71 (noting the writers on
international law who were important to the founding generation).
49. See, e.g., HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., TAMING THE PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF
MODERN EXECUTIVE POWER (1989); JOHN LAMBERTON HARPER, AMERICAN MACHIAVELLI:
ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE ORIGINS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2004); MACHIAVELLI’S
LIBERAL REPUBLICAN LEGACY, supra note 41, at 189–278 (chapters on Adams, Jefferson,
Madison, and Hamilton); POCOCK, supra note 39, at 506–48; see also GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 32–36 (1969) (tracing
influence of Machiavelli’s analysis of corruption and renewal). I will not attempt to argue that
one or another person or position at any specific point in U.S. history necessary reflects
Grotian, Vattelian, or Machiavellian thought. It is enough for my argument that, one way or
another, the views of these writers were known, available, and used.
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The delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 had
little trouble with the role of treaties in a federal system: treaties
would be part of the supreme law of the land that overrode state law,
and most delegates agreed treaties would be self-executing in the
sense that they could be judicially enforceable federal law. 50 But,
other than assigning the making of treaties to the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate and giving the federal courts
potential jurisdiction over treaty cases, the delegates did little to sort
out how treaties would operate within the separation of powers—
that is, within a republican form of government in which the people
and the states would have distinct roles, and in which the types of
power (executive, legislative, and judicial) were divided. 51
The ratification process revealed the Constitutional Convention’s
failure to work out the separation of powers issues raised by treaties.
“Many Antifederalists believed the treaty power threatened
individual liberty and risked tyranny, particularly because the Senate
and President, neither of which would be popularly or directly
elected, would be able to make treaties that would have the force of
law.” 52 Treaties, in other words, would be a source of law that was
entirely under the control of the least democratic parts of the federal
government: the President, selected by electors; the Senate, selected
53
by state legislators; and the Judiciary, selected by the President and
confirmed by the Senate.
Many Antifederalists raised questions about the role of the
House of Representatives, particularly with respect to commercial
treaties, because they believed the Commerce Clause guaranteed the
House of Representatives a role in the implementation of
commercial treaties. 54 And, of course, the House was the only part of
the federal government that would be elected in something
approaching a democratic manner. Many Federalists resisted the
Antifederalist claims and denied a role for the House, while others,
including James Madison, admitted the practical power that the
50. See Parry, supra note 45, at 1225–27.
51. See id. at 1227; Sloss et al., supra note 47, at 13.
52. Parry, supra note 45, at 1228.
53. See U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 3, cl.1. Voters in each state did not have the ability to
elect senators directly until adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XVII.
54. See, e.g., Parry, supra note 45, at 1230–31.
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House would have and even suggested that it would have a necessary
role in implementing some treaties. 55
By the end of ratification, participants on both sides appear to have
concluded that treaties would trump state law under the
Supremacy Clause and would at least sometimes be enforceable in
judicial proceedings regardless of state law. On other issues, such as
the role of the House of Representatives and the interaction
between treaties and federal law, no consensus emerges . . . .
Numerous participants agreed that some treaties could not
function as law by themselves, with the result that legislation—and
thus House participation—would be necessary. 56

During the first thirty years of government under the new
Constitution—still within the lifetimes of many members of the
founding generation—the lack of consensus about the law of treaties
became fodder for important and bitterly divisive political debates.
For example, the Neutrality Controversy generated dissension about
the balance of executive and legislative power, the status of
international law, and the extent to which the new nation was bound
by international law obligations. 57
The debate in the House of Representatives over the validity and
implementation of the Jay Treaty of 1794 provided a showcase for
the lack of consensus about treaties. Indeed, “lack of consensus”
hardly captures the nature of the pamphlet war over the
55. See id. at 1262–63.
56. Id. at 1263–64.
57. Brian Richardson argues persuasively that the debate of President Washington’s
cabinet over neutrality rejected Vattel’s lenient approach to the force of international law and
the obligations of treaties (advocated by Hamilton), in favor of the more binding approaches
of Grotius and Pufendorf (advocated by Jefferson). See Richardson, supra note 31, at 556–59.
In the Pacificus-Helvidius debates over neutrality, Hamilton and Madison agreed that treaties
were often self-executing in the sense that they would operate as law without legislative
implementation. But, where Hamilton also stressed the power that a treaty could give to the
President, Madison stressed the legislative nature of treaty making (although he emphasized
the role of the Senate and did not advocate a role for the House). See Parry, supra note 45, at
1273–75; see also HARPER, supra note 49, at 120 (comparing Pacificus and Machiavelli);
MANSFIELD, supra note 49, at 275–78 (noting the importance of this debate for theories of
executive power and associating Hamilton’s views with Machiavelli); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The
Founders’ Foreign Affairs Constitution: Improvising Among Empires, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 209,
217 (2008) (stressing the extent to which the Neutrality Controversy displayed concurrent
foreign affairs authority). For the impact of the Neutrality Controversy on the debate over the
legal status of customary international law, see Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 46, at 1028–
37, and Sloss et al., supra note 47, at 26–27.
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constitutional validity of the treaty that preceded the House debate. 58
Notably, Hamilton, writing as Camillus, claimed that the provisions
of a treaty override the legislative power by repealing earlier
conflicting federal statutes and obliging Congress to implement the
treaty. 59 The ensuing debate in the House was wide-ranging and
extensive. 60 Boiled down, the Federalist position, which tended to
follow in Hamilton’s earlier steps, “sought, in the context of treaties,
to fortify the framers’ goal of insulating compliance with
international legal obligations from direct popular control.” 61 By
contrast, Republicans resisted
the ability of the President, in league with the more insulated
Senate, to go forward without regard to the House’s objections to
the treaty . . . . The greater democracy they sought was thus not
the right to violate treaties, but to veto bargains that the peoples’
representatives believed were inconsistent with their values and
against their interests. 62

Ultimately, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution by
the comfortable margin of 57-35 that disclaimed a role in making
treaties but insisted (1) that treaties on topics within the legislative
powers of Congress could go into effect only if Congress enacted
legislation, and (2) that the House had the authority to debate the
merits of the treaty when deciding whether to implement it. 63
Having taken that stand, the House voted 51-48 to authorize funds
to implement the Jay Treaty. 64
58. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 46, at 1044–48 (discussing Republican
attacks on specific provisions of the treaty and claims that treaties could not address subjects
within the legislative powers of Congress).
59. See Parry, supra note 45, at 1278–79. It is interesting that Camillus was an
important figure in Machiavelli’s discussion of the Roman republic. See HARPER, supra note
49, at 163–66.
60. For extensive discussion, see Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 46, at 1048–61,
and Parry, supra note 45, at 1280–93.
61. Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 46, at 1054. Golove and Hulsebosch also
contend this position was consistent with “the original foreign affairs Constitution.” See id.
Given the lack of consensus about treaties that emerged during ratification, I believe their
assertion is too strong.
62. Id. at 1060–61.
63. See Parry, supra note 45, at 1289.
64. See id. at 1290. For contrasting assertions about the significance of these votes,
compare Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 46, at 1059–61, with Parry, supra note 45,
at 1291–94.
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In 1800, the House again debated the treaty power when it
considered whether to censure President Adams for his role in the
extradition of Jonathan Robbins. This time, the issue was the power
of the President to implement a treaty, and the debate is best known
for Congressman John Marshall’s speech, which argued that not all
treaty provisions are enforceable in judicial proceedings, that some
treaty provisions can be implemented by the President alone, and
that some treaty provisions require legislative implementation.65
Critically, Marshall also claimed that “if Congress fails in its duty to
implement a treaty, then as a matter of necessity the President must
execute it to avoid defaulting on an obligation to another nation.”66
Although the Federalists prevailed and prevented the censure, the
impact of Marshall’s speech with respect to these issues is difficult to
determine. Details of the Republican responses to Marshall have not
survived. Still, there is no reason to believe they agreed with
Marshall that the President could implement treaty provisions that
ordinarily would require legislative implementation simply because
Congress had not acted. 67
Congress returned to these issues in 1815 and 1816, when it
debated the extent to which it had to implement the 1815 commercial
convention with Great Britain. After a fierce debate, the House
approved a resolution that repealed all portions of federal statutes that
were inconsistent with the new treaty, over Federalist objections that
the treaty, as supreme law of the land, already had accomplished that
result. 68 The Senate rejected the House resolution, apparently because
of “opposition to the House’s claims that treaties can neither override
statutes nor go into immediate effect without House participation if
they overlap with enumerated legislative powers.”69 The resulting
legislation did not explicitly repeal any statutory provisions; “it merely
‘enacted and declared’ that such legislation should be ‘deemed and
taken to be of no force or effect.’” 70

65. See Parry, supra note 45, at 1297–1301.
66. Id. at 1301.
67. See id. at 1302–03.
68. See id. at 1305–11.
69. Id. at 1313.
70. Id. at 1315 (quoting An Act Concerning the Convention to regulate the
Commerce Between the territories of the United States and His Britannic Majesty, ch. 22, 3
Stat. 255 (1816)).
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The 1816 legislation retreated from the Jay Treaty resolution of
1796. But, the Federalist position of 1796 also lost adherents.
Members of Congress moved toward a more moderate position that
suggested the foundations for a consensus about the nature of
treaties as law within a democratic republic. This moderate position
“had two critical components: admitting that not all treaties operate
as law by themselves, and advancing the last-in-time rule as a way to
balance the legislative and treaty powers.” 71
By the end of these debates, thoughtful Senators and Representatives
had almost fully articulated the doctrine that some treaties were selfexecuting and could be put into effect by the President or courts,
while others required implementing legislation. This view tended to
claim a larger role for treaties than many republicans desired, and the
last-in-time rule operated as a necessary corollary to the idea of selfexecution . . . [T]he last-in-time rule as it emerged from these
debates was the thoughtful resolution of a difficult theoretical and
political issue. Its function was to ensure that the House would have
an important albeit more limited constitutional role in overseeing the
implementation and operation of treaties. 72

Congress, in short, was able over time to set up a framework to
resolve some of the tensions about the interactions between treaties
and the American version of republican democracy. The Supreme
Court’s subsequent foundational opinions on the last-in-time rule
and the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties tracked the results of these political debates. 73 The debates
also help to explain and support the development of congressionalexecutive agreements in areas that involve foreign relations but are
also subject to Congress’s legislative authority. 74
71. Id. at 1316.
72. Id.; see also id. (“[Federalist] proponents of the last-in-time rule admitted that the
treaty power was not superior to legislative power, that Congress was not bound by treaties,
and that it could override them.”).
73. See id. at 1320–28 (discussing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829),
United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833), The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 616 (1870), The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884), and Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190 (1888)).
74. See id. at 1332; see also CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S.
LEGAL SYSTEM 76 (2d ed. 2015) (noting among the reasons for the rise of congressionalexecutive agreements that “there was increasing overlap between international agreements and
Congress’s regulatory authority, prompting a shift from having treaties approved by a
supermajority of the Senate to having them approved by a majority of the full Congress”);
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These specific doctrinal developments are significant. But, the
political debates that produced these doctrines also required
members of Congress to address the question of how to
accommodate, on the one hand, the international obligations of the
United States with, on the other hand, its internal structure of
federalism and separation of powers. As they did so, their ideas about
federalism and separation of powers changed. Treaties, therefore,
were at the center of and played an important role in shaping
founding-era political theory.
More conventionally, these debates, accommodations, and
doctrines also suggested a theory of how treaties might operate in
such a system. That is to say, the political theory of American
republican democracy also shaped the theory and law of treaties.
Seen from the perspective of founding era political theory, treaties
create binding legal obligations with other countries and also, under
the Constitution, have the status of domestic law. Yet they are
necessarily a product of executive authority and, therefore, risk
playing a role in the centralization of power not only at the federal
level but also in the person of the President (and to some extent in
the Senate within the legislative branch). Thus, a treaty cannot be
allowed to have greater status than other forms of federal law, a
conclusion that supported adoption of the last-in-time rule. Further,
Congress, and particularly the House of Representatives, is jealous
(and, arguably, intended to be jealous) of its legislative authority, and
it will occasionally resist executive encroachment on that authority
(sometimes properly so). The operation of these checks and balances
means that treaties will sometimes have legal force but incomplete
implementation, and they can be cast aside (at least as a matter of
domestic law) by the passage of formally equal legislation.
III. TREATIES AND THE RESTATEMENTS: TRACES OF THEORIES
In the years between the founding era and World War II, the
Supreme Court’s interactions with treaties fit into the framework
discussed above. The Court applied the last-in-time rule, accepted
and applied treaties as law, but also acknowledged that some treaty
Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in
the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1286–1302 (2008) (providing a history of executive
agreements and congressional-executive agreements).
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provisions would not be self-executing. 75 Other issues, however, also
emerged. “[T]he Court began to hint at theories of deference that
gave weight to the political branches’ views.” 76 The Court also
recognized the President’s power to make international agreements,
sometimes with congressional authorization, but without the advice
and consent process necessary to make a treaty. These agreements,
the Court determined, are binding on the United States and
preempt state law. 77 The positivist approach to international law—
which rejected the equivalence of individuals and states that Grotius
had championed but Machiavelli had denied, and which forced
reconsideration of whether, how, and to what extent international
law had binding force—gained increasing acceptance. 78 Also worth
noting is the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913,
which weakened claims that treaties lack democratic legitimacy by
providing for direct popular election of Senators rather than
79
appointment by state legislatures. Finally, the power and influence
of the United States expanded, especially beginning in the late
nineteenth century, and the United States became a colonial power
80
outside its borders after the Spanish-American War.
The post-World War II period, which saw the emergence of the
United States as a “super” power, produced “a profound sense of

75. See Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1861–1900, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note 47, at 55, 73–76, 79 (noting the adoption of the
last-in-time rule and stating “the Court continued to regard treaties as law” even as it “explor[ed]
the possibilities of non-self-execution”); Sloss et al., supra note 47, at 23 (“[F]or the most part,
the Court dealt with treaties as law, to be interpreted by courts in good faith and applied to
decide issues presented in litigation.”); Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court,
1901–1945, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note 47, at 191, 193
(suggesting “continuity” with earlier periods).
76. Hollis, supra note 75, at 56; see also Van Alstine, supra note 75, at 217–18 (noting
the continued development of this idea).
77. See Van Alstine, supra note 75, at 218–23 (discussing the approval of these
agreements and recognition of their force in Supreme Court case law).
78. See Hollis, supra note 75, at 62–65.
79. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
80. This paragraph’s suggestion of measured change does not mean that all was
continuity in the field of foreign relations law. See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the
Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (contending “the first
four decades of the twentieth century” witnessed “a vertical and horizontal centralization of
foreign relations powers in the Federal Executive. A shorthand rendering of this transformation
. . . was the triumph of ‘executive discretion’ in the constitutional regime of
foreign relations”).
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change, accented by undertones of continuity” in the Supreme
Court’s approach to treaties. 81 According to Paul Stephan, the Court
was more willing to consider differences among treaties and
displayed caution about using treaties to restrain federal sovereign
authority; it also gave greater deference to executive branch
interpretations of treaty language. 82
These post-war changes coincided with an explosion in
international law-making through multi-lateral conventions. Indeed,
concerns about these conventions, particularly their human rights
provisions, prompted a congressional backlash. In 1953, the Senate
came within one vote of recommending the Bricker
Amendment, which
provided that any provision of a treaty or other international
agreement that conflicted with the Constitution would have no
force or effect, that treaties could become effective as ‘internal law’
in the United States only through legislation that would be valid in
the absence of the treaty, and that Congress would have power to
regulate all executive and other agreements with foreign nations
and organizations. 83

These proposals resurrected some of the extreme Republican
positions from the Jay Treaty debate and rejected the compromise
position toward treaties that had emerged by the end of the
founding era (although, of course, in quite a different context). To
defeat the amendment, the Eisenhower administration “agreed not
to accede to the emerging human rights conventions” and adopted
“the core commitment of Bricker to prevent the use of international

81. Paul B. Stephan, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1946-2000, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note 47, at 317, 318–19. For the assertion that
these changes were more general, see White, supra note 80, at 8 (stating that by 1945, “the
constitutional distinction between treaties and executive agreements was robbed of its
significance, the states were virtually eliminated as overseers in the realm of foreign affairs, and
the Federal Executive, rather than federal or state courts, was established as the authoritative
source of foreign sovereign immunities”).
82. See Stephan, supra note 81, at 320, 335. For discussions of federal court deference
to executive branch interpretations of treaties, see Harlan Grant Cohen, The Death of Deference
and the Domestication of Treaty Law, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1467 (2016), and Jean Galbraith,
What Should Restatement (Fourth) Say about Treaty Interpretation?, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1499
(2016).
83. Hathaway, supra note 74, at 1302.
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human rights agreements to effect internal changes.” 84 When the
United States began ratifying human rights conventions in the late
1980s, “it paid fealty to the ‘ghost of Senator Bricker’ by
eviscerating the agreements with reservations, understandings, and
declarations that rendered them unenforceable.” 85
The rest of this part will consider the Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, the Restatement (Third),
and the current drafts of the Restatement (Fourth). In the course of
examining their provisions, comments, and reporters’ notes on the
topic of treaties, this part will argue that these materials describe
somewhat different approaches to the nature of international law and
the problems posed by the intersections of international law with the
U.S. political system. Those approaches, in turn, reflect or generate
fragmentary political theories. The Restatement (Second) is
overwhelmingly pragmatic; the Restatement (Third) elevates
internationalism over democratic processes; and the drafts of the
Restatement (Fourth) focus on governance in ways that could
produce interesting and significant consequences.
A. The Restatement (Second): Balance and Caution86
In 1955, the American Law Institute (ALI) approved a project
to draft a restatement of foreign relations law. 87 From the beginning,
ALI members were concerned about the political issues that such a
project could raise, particularly in light of the recent Bricker
Amendment controversy. 88 Nor could they have been anything other
than conscious of the enhanced role that the United States played on
84. Id. at 1303–04; see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human
Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 410–13 (2000) (discussing the
Bricker debates).
85. Hathaway, supra note 74, at 1304 (citing Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of
Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341 (1995)).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Although the Restatement (Second) was the ALI’s first
treatment of foreign relations law, it was designated the Restatement (Second) because it was
part of the ALI’s second series of Restatements. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Restatement’s
Treatment of Sources and Evidence of International Law, in COMMENTARIES ON THE
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 2
n.5 (1992).
87. See David Sloss, The Death of Treaty Supremacy: An Invisible Constitutional Change,
ch. 13, ms 5 (Dec. 2014) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
88. See id. ms 5–6.
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the post-war world stage. Herbert Weschler’s introduction to the
final product reflects the ALI’s balancing act. On the one hand, he
invoked the internationalist ideal of “the maintenance and
development of law in the governance of international relationships”
while, on the other hand, hinting that the new Restatement
confirmed American exceptionalism and preeminence, for it “bears
witness to the values of a free society . . . [and] may demonstrate
those values in a wider sphere.” 89
The specific provisions of the Restatement (Second) reflect, in
large part, a commitment to international law, subject to the
90
founding-era compromise. But, they also demonstrate awareness of
the Bricker debates and a concern for state interests, flexibility, and,
arguably, the post-war status of the United States.
For example, the Restatement (Second) follows Grotius and
Vattel (and, of course, subsequent writers) when, in the introductory
note to Part III on international agreements, it makes a strong
conceptual analogy between treaties and private contracts even as it
notes that the private law of contracts may not provide useful
doctrinal analogies. 91 Following the Grotian view of treaties that was
important to the founding generation, 92 the note and a subsequent
section also affirm the premise that treaty promises must be kept. 93
Indeed, although the Restatement (Second) contemplates a few
scenarios in which it would be legitimate to suspend or terminate a
treaty, it comes nowhere close to the Vattelian suggestion (let alone
the Machiavellian assertion) that treaty compliance is voluntary. 94
The Restatement (Second) also provides that, under international
law, an international agreement may be made on any topic, so long

89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES intro. at vii, x (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
90. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES pt. III, intro. n.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
92. See, e.g., supra note 57 (discussing the cabinet debate over the
neutrality controversy).
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES pt. III, intro. n.1 & § 138 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
94. See id. §§ 153, 155–159. Section 153, which provides that a “substantial change of
circumstances” can justify suspension or termination, is the most interesting. Note that it only
applies if, as a matter of treaty interpretation, “the parties would not have intended the [treaty]
obligations to be applicable under the changed circumstances.” Id. § 153(1).
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as the agreement is consistent with United Nations obligations and
“basic standards of international conduct.” 95 Yet with respect to the
United States, that power narrows. The United States may make
international agreements only if “the matter is of international
concern” and “does not contravene any of the limitations of the
Constitution applicable to all powers of the United States.” 96 The
nature of this power in general reflects federal exclusivity in
international relations, 97 and the second limitation reflects the
supremacy of the Constitution over statutes and treaties. 98 The first
limitation, by contrast, reflects federalism and separation of powers
concerns that treaties could be used “for the regulation of matters
bearing no relation to international affairs.” 99 Still, the scope of the
authority to make treaties derives from the treaty power itself and is
not limited by the specific enumerated powers vested in Congress by
Article I. 100 Thus, the Restatement (Second) largely confirms federal
power, even though it also contains seeds of a revisionist approach
that reflects the Bricker debates and hearkens back to the Jay
Treaty debate.
In addition to confirming federal power, the Restatement
(Second) further endorsed executive power when it provided that
executive agreements made pursuant to the President’s

95. Id. § 116.
96. Id. § 117.
97. See id. § 117 cmt. c (“[A]uthority essential to the conduct of foreign relations (the
authority to enter into international agreements) is expressly denied the several states without
the consent of Congress.”).
98. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (indicating that the Constitution is
superior to treaties). Note, however, that the Restatement comments suggest the purpose of
this limitation was primarily structural; the reference in Comment d to the Bill of Rights seems
almost an afterthought. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 117 cmts. c, d (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 117 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 63–64
(suggesting the sources of this limitation are a 1929 statement by future Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes, and a 1955 statement by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles opposing efforts
to revive the Bricker Amendment). Compare De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266–67
(1890) (“[T]he treaty power of the United States extends to all proper subjects of negotiation
between our government and the governments of other nations . . . . [I]t is not perceived that
there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which is properly
the subject of negotiation with a foreign country.”).
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 118 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also id. cmts. a, b.
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constitutional authority are binding and preemptive, although it also
respected the role of Congress and the overlapping powers of the
President and Congress by providing that executive agreements do
not displace federal legislation. 101 The Restatement (Second) also
recognized established practice by providing for the validity and
force of congressional-executive agreements. 102 And on the question
of terminating an agreement, the authority lies entirely with
the president. 103
Turning to the domestic status and implementation of treaties,
the Restatement (Second) takes a curious view. 104 If a treaty
“manifests an intention that it shall become effective as domestic law
of the United States,” then it is self-executing, overrides earlier
federal statutes, and preempts state law. 105 But if it does not manifest
such an intention, then it is not self-executing; neither does it
override federal statutes nor preempt state law. 106 Oddly, then, a
ratified treaty, which has the status of supreme law of the land, has
essentially no domestic legal force if it is not self-executing. 107 Here
the separation of powers concern that drove the early debates about
self-execution takes on a federalism dimension that presumably
reflects the Bricker debates and the compromises that resulted from
them. 108 The Restatement (Second) also provides that a treaty cannot
be self-executing if “it involves governmental action that under the
Constitution can be taken only by the Congress” 109—a position that

101. Id. §§ 121, 144. See also id. §§ 119, 142 (discussing executive agreements pursuant
to treaty).
102. Id. §§ 120, 143.
103. Id. § 163.
104. For detailed discussion of the Restatement (Second)’s provisions on self-execution,
see Sloss, supra note 87, at ms 9–15.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 141(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
106. See id. § 141(2).
107. See id. § 141 cmt. a (noting that although a treaty is binding as a matter of
international law, it has “immediate domestic effect as the supreme law of the land . . . only if it
is self-executing”).
108. See supra notes 83–85; David Sloss, Taming Madison’s Monster: How to Fix SelfExecution Doctrine, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1692, 1712–14 (2016).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 141(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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rejects extreme Federalist positions but also rejects Republican claims
about the Commerce Clause. 110
Elsewhere, the Restatement (Second) takes a defensive tone as it
defends treaty self-execution. Section 154 insists that self-execution
is simply an issue of treaty interpretation, to be decided by the
federal courts. The reporters’ notes make a mild effort to justify the
doctrine of self-execution by rebutting the claim that self-execution
111
damages the interests of the United States. The notes are more
forceful when they assert the utility of self-execution for mostfavored-nation clauses. 112
The authors of the Restatement (Second) had little trouble
endorsing the Senate’s inclusion of reservations and understandings
in its resolution of advice and consent to a treaty. 113 Perhaps
reflecting historical practice as much or more than the Bricker
controversy, 114 the Restatement (Second) expresses no constitutional
concerns about reservations and understandings and goes on to
declare that they also function as domestic law 115—subject to mild
concern about “the extent to which the Senate . . . may ‘legislate by
reservation’
without
the
concurrence
of
the
House
of Representatives.” 116

110. See id. § 141 cmt. f (suggesting appropriations are an area in which only congress
can act and expressly denying that “the making of a self-executing treaty dealing with foreign
commerce is precluded”).
111. See id. § 154 reporters’ note 1. Note 1 observes that self-execution does not exist in
several other countries, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, and it also notes the claim
that self-execution would damage the United States vis-à-vis these other countries. But, the
note concludes, these disadvantages do not really exist because in most of these countries,
“there exists a cabinet form of government in which executive and legislative powers are
merged,” and implementing legislation is often “introduced as a part of the
ratification process.” Id.
112.

See id. § 154 reporters’ note 3.

113. See id. § 133(1)–(2). The Restatement (Second) even provides that the record of the
Senate’s consideration of the treaty can give rise to reservations or understandings. See id. § 133(3).
114. For the assertion that historical practice supports the use of reservations and
understandings, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 84, at 404–10.
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 134, 135 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). For the argument in favor of the general validity
of reservations, understandings, and declarations (with some limitations), see Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 84, at 439–56.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 134 reporters’ note (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (discussing the Niagara Power case,
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With respect to treaty interpretation, the authors of the
Restatement (Second) drew attention to the International Law
Commission’s work on what would eventually become the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties 117 and provided its own set of
“[c]riteria for [i]nterpretation” as a matter of international law. 118 With
respect to U.S. law, the Restatement (Second) provides that the
judiciary has “exclusive authority to interpret an international
agreement to which the United States is a party,” 119 but it also asserts,
in keeping with the developing practice as well as with the increasing
importance of the President to international relations (from the
international as well as U.S. perspective), that a federal court “gives
great weight to an interpretation made by the executive branch.”120
Sections 149 and 150, read together, support the argument that this
deference applies only to executive interpretations “asserted [on behalf
of] the United States in the conduct of its foreign relations,” as
opposed to interpretations that arise in the course of litigation. To the
extent that is a permissible interpretation, the Restatement (Second)
does not explain how to navigate the boundary.
The Restatement (Second) presents itself as a straightforward
articulation of foreign relations law principles. Yet to be
straightforward in the post-World War II period required a balance
because those principles were in flux. Executive power continued to
increase, particularly in foreign relations, even as the Senate in
particular and Congress more generally sometimes chafed at or were
suspicious of that power and the uses to which it might be put. The
Restatement (Second) recognizes executive authority but tries as well
to retain a meaningful role for Congress. In addition, the ALI’s
sensitivity to the issues raised by the Bricker debates reveals the
strength of federalism concerns.
With respect to separation of powers, therefore, the tensions that
revealed themselves in the founding era continued to play out, but
with some movement toward the Federalist view—or at least the
Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957), vacated as
moot, 355 U.S. 64 (1957)).
117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES pt. III, intro. note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
118. See id. § 147.
119. Id. § 150.
120. Id. § 152.
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Federalism of Congressman Marshall—on the scope of executive
121
power. The emergence of federalism as a treaty issue, by contrast,
was more of a departure from earlier understandings, but it was also
a response to changed circumstances: the emergence of the United
States as a super power, the rapid development of international law
and international institutions, and the implications of these changes
for the power of the federal government within the domestic federal
system. Leaving aside the desirability of the Restatement (Second)’s
solutions to these issues, these shifts from earlier understandings
were not a cause for concern. A democratic political system that
incorporates federalism and separation of powers will likely revisit
longstanding tensions and foundational debates with some
frequency, particularly with respect to control over foreign affairs.
Overall, the political theory of the Restatement (Second) is
pragmatic. Continuity, or at least stability, appears to have been a
primary goal. This pragmatism, moreover, had an ideological point.
As the first effort to corral the issues surrounding treaties and foreign
relations generally, the Restatement (Second) brought these topics
into greater view, asserted the existence and legitimacy of an
important field in American law, and insisted on the importance of
U.S. engagement with international law and international society. In
light of the federalism and separation of powers debates surrounding
treaties and international law at the time, achieving all of these goals
was a significant accomplishment.
B. The Restatement (Third): Internationalism

122

If the Restatement (Second) was pragmatic and cautious, the
Restatement (Third) took a different, more assertive tone. “The
student of international law,” declared one commentator, “is struck
by the confidence and simplicity with which a number of the rules in
the Restatement (Third) are stated.” 123 At times, argumentative is a
121. Marshall’s view of executive authority in foreign relations had, of course, been
endorsed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
319 (1936) (“As Marshall said in his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of
Representatives, ‘The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its
sole representative with foreign nations.’”).
122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (AM. LAW INST. 1986).
123. McCaffrey, supra note 86, at 5.
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better description than confidence for the tone of the materials that
comprise the Restatement (Third). When discussing the Restatement
(Third), therefore, it is worth remembering that the reporters’ notes
do not receive ALI approval (unlike the sections and comments),124
and their tone may reflect some of the intense debate and
controversy that arose during the drafting process. 125
In addition, if the Restatement (Second) stands in the shadow of
the rise of the United States as a superpower on the one hand, and
the Bricker debates on the other hand, then the Restatement (Third)
is in part a self-conscious effort to undo the results of the Bricker
debates while also thwarting the Reagan administration. The
Restatement (Third) takes a strong position on the deep divide
(represented roughly at the time by actual and claimed differences
between the Carter and Reagan administrations) on the question
whether United States foreign policy should seek to advance human
rights and international law (e.g., Carter) or should simply pursue
national interests (e.g., Reagan). Thus, the introduction declares that
the Restatement (Third) is “a reaffirmation: relations between
nations are not anarchic; they are governed by law. In conducting
the foreign relations of the United States, [federal officials] are not at
large in a political process; they are under law.” 126
The introductory note to Part 1, Chapter 1 goes on to stress
“the international community of states,” the status of international
law as “law like other law,” and the fact that international law is
“essential” to the “decentralized” “international political system”; it
124. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES at XI (AM. LAW INST. 1986).
125. See McCaffrey, supra note 86, at 7. For further discussion of the controversies
associated with drafting the Restatement (Third), as well as the tone and status of the
reporters’ notes, see The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
Revised: How Were the Controversies Resolved?, 81 ASIL Proceedings 180 (1987). See also
Leila Nadya Sadat, The Proposed Restatement Fourth of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States: Treaties–Some Serious Procedural and Substantive Concerns, 2015 BYU L.
R EV. 1673 (2016) (proving a more neutral account and arguing for the success of the
Restatement (Third)).
126. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES intro. at 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1986). But see Richard A. Falk, Conceptual Foundations,
14 YALE J. INT’L L. 439, 443 (1989) (calling the intention behind this statement “laudable”
but also criticizing it as an overly schematic either-or formulation and suggesting “a world
of sovereign states is necessarily a species of anarchy,” such that the important inquiry is
“[t]he operation of rules, reciprocal tolerances, and regimes takes place, more or less
effectively, within a setting of anarchy”).
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expressly rejects interest-based accounts of international law. 127 With
respect to treaties, the introductory note is equally emphatic: “In our
day, treaties have become the principal vehicle for making law for the
international system,” and “the basic principle that makes
international agreements . . . binding is the principle of customary
law that agreements must be observed” 128 (a point made black letter
law in Section 321). Human rights receive an emphasis much
different from their relatively unimportant treatment in the
Restatement (Second): “International law . . . deals not only with the
conduct of states and international organizations and with relations
among them, but increasingly also with relations of states with
juridical and natural persons, including those in the state’s own
territory.” 129 This statement also suggests the rearrangement of
foreign relations power away from the executive, towards division
among the branches—including the judiciary—and greater
protection of individuals. 130
The reporters’ note goes on to place the Restatement (Third)
within a venerable international law tradition: “The classic writers—
Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel—are still ‘most highly qualified
publicists’ . . . , and their writings are living literature of international
law . . . .” 131 Indeed, there is little doubt that the Restatement
(Third) is self-consciously part of the “Grotian tradition in
international law.” 132 The document’s internationalist rhetoric
provides significant support for this claim. The assertion that treaty
agreements must be observed, present in the Restatement (Second) as
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
pt. I, ch. 1, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1986). In the face of such claims, Richard Falk
suggested that the drafters of the Third Restatement were not competent to discuss “the
nature of the sovereign state; the character of international society as a whole; the interplay of
law and politics in the interpenetrated settings of governmental decisions and of international
society in general.” Falk, supra note 126, at 445.
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
pt. I, ch. 1, intro. n. at 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1986).
129. Id. at 19. In addition to this language, several sections of the Restatement (Third)
directly address human rights. See id. §§ 701–703, 711. These provisions appear in Part VII of
the Restatement (Third), under the title “Protection of Persons (Natural and Juridical).”
130. See id. intro. at 4.
131. Id. pt. I, ch. 1, intro. note, reporters’ note 1, at 21.
132. See Lauterpacht, supra note 15. For the assertion that the Grotian tradition is an
“invented tradition” constructed to serve the interests of post-World War II internationalism,
see Parry, supra note 10, at 366–68.
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well, provides some additional evidence, as do the comments to
Section 102, which also follow the Restatement (Second) in
comparing traditional treaties to private contracts. 133 Richard Falk’s
observation that the Restatement (Third) is “notable for its move
beyond a strict positivism of states” toward “an enlarged sense of the
international legal order” is also consistent with this claim. 134
The introductory notes to Chapter 2 provide a general
assessment of how international law interacts with U.S. law. First,
“[i]nternational law is, and is given effect as, law in the United
States”; 135 it has this status “without the need for any action by
Congress or the President”; 136 and in the post-Erie era it is “a kind of
federal law” that is supreme over state law and binding on the
states. 137 But for all that, international law “is subject to the
Constitution, and is also subject to ‘repeal’ by other law of the

133. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1986) (noting that treaties ordinarily make law in the way
that a contract does, between the parties, but that multilateral agreements “are increasingly
used for general legislation, whether to make new law, as in human rights . . . , or for codifying
and developing customary law, as in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”); see also
id. pt. III, intro. note at 147 (making the same comparison).
134. Falk, supra note 126, at 449.
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
pt. I, ch. 2, intro. n. at 40 (AM. LAW INST. 1986).
136. Id. at 41.
137. Id. at 42. This assertion, of course, has proven controversial. Compare Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) (arguing that customary
international law is not federal law unless the federal political branches adopt it as such), with
Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1825
(1998) (asserting that “the hornbook rule—international law, as applied in the United States,
must be federal law—makes obvious sense”), and Daniel J. Meltzer, Customary International
Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 513 (2002) (arguing that
customary international law is not automatically federal common law but can be incorporated
into it), and Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the
Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1495, 1501 (2011) (“[N]ot all of customary international law binds . . . the federal
Executive as a matter of U.S. domestic law . . . . [However, it] binds State actors and thus
preempts State law . . . .”). See also Eric Talbot Jensen, Presidential Pronouncements of
Customary International Law as an Alternative to the Senate’s Advice and Consent, 2015 BYU
L. REV. 1525 (2016) (demonstrating that recent presidents have required domestic agencies to
comply with treaties that have not been approved by the Senate but which represent customary
international law principles).
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United States.” 138 The discussion of treaties notes the difference
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, stresses the
status of treaties as law under the Supremacy Clause while withholding
discussion of non-self-execution until the actual sections, and observes
that “cases arising under treaties are within the Judicial Power of the
United States.” 139 All of this serves to underscore the Restatement
(Third)’s emphasis on the status of international law as enforceable
law that is essential to international relations.
Section 111(1) is equally forceful, declaring that “[i]nternational
law and international agreements of the United States are law of the
United States and supreme over the law of the several States.” 140 The
comments make clear that executive agreements and congressionalexecutive agreements are included in the term “international
agreements” and are therefore also supreme preemptive federal
law. 141 Only in Section 111(3) does the Restatement (Third) observe
that “a ‘non-self-executing’ agreement will not be given effect [by
courts] as law in the absence of necessary implementation.” 142 Then,
Section 111(4) defines the circumstances under which a treaty is
non-self-executing: when the “agreement manifests an intention”
not to be “effective as domestic law without . . . implementing
legislation,” when the Senate’s consent or a congressional resolution
require implementing legislation, or when the Constitution requires
legislation. 143 The first and third limitations are consistent with the
Restatement (Second), although the syntax of the Restatement
(Third) suggests a preference for self-execution instead of the
Restatement (Second)’s neutrality. The second limitation was new; it
reflected the U.S. practice of using reservations and understanding
to limit the enforceability of human rights treaties in the years after
the Restatement (Second) was adopted. 144 A later discussion, however,
138. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
pt. I, ch. 2, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
139. Id. at 41.
140. Id. § 111(1).
141. See id. § 111 cmt. d; see also id. § 303 (discussing the President’s authority to make
treaties and other international agreements); Sadat, supra note 123, at 1682 (praising this
aspect of § 111(1)).
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1986).
143. Id. § 111(4).
144. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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asserts that reservations or understandings are effective and limiting
only if consistent with Section 313, which roughly condenses the
Vienna Convention rules on reservations. 145
Compared to the Restatement (Second), the exact status of a
non-self-executing treaty in the Restatement (Third) is not clear. Is it
supreme and preemptive law, or not (as in the Restatement
(Second))? Section 111(1) appears to speak for all international
146
the syntax of Section 111(3) indicates that its
agreements;
147
limitation is directed to courts only; and Comment h states that
the self-execution inquiry “is a question distinct from whether the
148
treaty creates private rights or remedies.” Perhaps, then, all treaties
are supreme and preemptive, but non-self-executing treaties are not
enforceable in federal court, even if they create rights and remedies
(which perhaps are enforceable in some other fashion?). 149 This
position risks creating a situation in which treaties are supreme in
theory and irrelevant in practice. The Restatement (Third),
therefore, appears to strengthen the status of non-self-executing
treaties by weakening the Restatement (Second)’s flat assertion that
such treaties are neither supreme nor preemptive, but it remains
unclear what non-self-executing treaties actually accomplish. 150
145. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 314 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“If a treaty is ratified or acceded to by the United
States with a reservation effective under the principles stated in § 313, the reservation is part of
the treaty and is law of the United States.”); see also id. § 313 cmt. b (noting the source of §
313’s limitations in the Vienna Convention).
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1986).
147. Id. § 111(3).
148. Id. § 111 cmt. h.
149. Compare id. § 115 cmt. e (suggesting that “[e]ven a non-self-executing agreement
of the United States, not effective as law until implemented by legislative or executive action,
may sometimes be held to be federal policy superseding State law or policy”), with id. § 312
cmt. k (stating “the date an agreement enters into force” is “the earliest date on which it can
become the law of the land to the extent it is self-executing under the rules stated in § 111”).
See also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
TREATIES, at xxv (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015) (“Although there was some
language in the prior Restatement that might be read to suggest that a non-self-executing
treaty provision lacked any status as domestic law—see, for example, § 115, Comment e, and §
312, Comment k, of the Restatement Third—those statements were ambiguous, and the
dominant approach of the Restatement Third was to address self-execution in the context of
judicial enforcement.”).
150. Uncertainty about the Restatement (Third) and the status of non-self-executing
treaties also emerges from the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
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The reporters’ notes to Section 111 add another layer of
complexity. Note 5 asserts that if the President does not request
legislation to implement a treaty and Congress does not act, then
courts should apply a strong presumption that the treaty is self151
executing. This position reflects Congressman Marshall’s claim in
the Robbins debate that the President can implement a treaty if
Congress fails to do so. 152 Even more, this assertion puts an
interesting twist on the idea that self-execution depends on
intention. Failure to implement supports a presumption that the
intent was self-execution because proof of intent comes not from
establishing a state of mind but instead from the proxy of inaction.
Note 5 goes on to provide guidance on what kinds of treaties are
likely to be self-executing, asserting that a treaty is self-executing if it
“can be readily given effect by executive or judicial bodies, federal or
State.” 153 Here, too, the idea of intention is less a fact about a
personal or institutional state of mind than it is a conclusion derived
from a different analysis altogether (an analysis of the treaty’s text).
Also important is how easily the note and the comments accept
another of Marshall’s assertions in the Robbins debates—that treaties
may be self-executing for the executive branch as well as for the
courts. 154 While this may be an obvious (if potentially dangerous)
proposition, the Restatement (Second) did not mention it.
Note 5 also evidences a need to justify self-execution more
extensively than the tepid effort of the Restatement (Second): “Self(2008), which cited the Restatement (Third) selectively. See BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 48
(noting the uncertainty over Medellín); John T. Parry, A Primer on Treaties and § 1983
After Medellín v. Texas, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 35, 61, 67–68 (2009) (critiquing the
Court’s use of the Restatement (Third)). For more comprehensive analysis of self-execution
doctrine, its complexities, and the ways that the Restatements address it, see Michael D.
Ramsey, A Textual Approach to Treaty Non-Self-Execution, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1639 (2016);
Sloss, Taming Madison’s Monster, supra note 108; Carlos M. Vázquez, Four Problems with
the Draft Restatement’s Treatment of Treaty Self-Execution, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1747 (2016).
Although they take different views on aspects of self-execution doctrine, all three criticize
the importance that the Restatements place on “intent” when addressing the issue of
self-execution.
151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111 reporters’ note 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1986).
152. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111 reporters’ note 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1986).
154. See also id. § 111 cmt. c (“[T]he President has the obligation and the necessary
authority to take care that [international agreements] be faithfully executed.”).
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executing treaties were contemplated by the Constitution and have
been common. They avoid delay in carrying out the obligations of
the United States.” 155 The note goes on to observe, approvingly, that
self-executing treaties “eliminate the need for participation by the
House of Representatives (which the Framers of the Constitution had
excluded from the treaty process), and for going to the Senate a second
time . . . after the Senate had already consented to the treaty by twothirds vote.” 156 Finally, Note 5 recognizes that treaty negotiators are
sometimes sensitive to claims about House authority, but subsequent
notes cast doubt on the idea that the House has any meaningful
authority in this context at all. For example, Reporters’ Note 6 quarrels
with Section 111(3)(c) and Comment i when it suggests, “There is no
definitive authority for the rule . . . that agreements on some subjects
cannot be self-executing.”157 The note argues there is no convincing
textual justification in the Constitution but also recognizes that the
limitation is “generally assumed,”158 suggesting, perhaps, that the issue
was not worth fighting over at the time.
The title of Reporters’ Note 7 is “[o]bligation of Congress to
implement international agreement.” 159 It recognizes that “[t]he
House of Representatives, in particular, has asserted a right to
consider anew whether to appropriate such money or to enact such
legislation,” but the note claims, entirely incorrectly, that “these
assertions were rejected early in our history, and repeatedly thereafter,
as an improper attempt to give the House of Representatives an
effective part in the Treaty Power contrary to the clear intention of the
Framers.” 160 Note 7 does admit, however, that “there may be no way
to enforce the obligation” to implement a treaty. 161
In short, Section 111 makes relatively modest changes from the
Restatement (Second), and it accepts that non-self-executing treaties
have no legal force in at least some contexts. But the reporters’ notes
155. Id. § 111 reporters’ note 5.
156. Id.
157. Id. § 111 reporters’ note 6.
158. Id.
159. Id. § 111 reporters’ note 7; see also id. § 111 cmt. j (asserting Congress has
constitutional authority to implement a valid international agreement).
160. Id. § 111 reporters’ note 7. For a sustained refutation of this assertion, see Parry,
supra note 45, at 1273–1316.
161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111 reporters’ note 7 (AM. LAW INST. 1986).

1615

5.PARRY.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/6/2016 7:37 AM

2015

push back with a more radical tone, reminiscent of the positions of
Hamilton and other hard-line Federalists, as well as the less hard-line
Federalism of Marshall. For the most part, these positions had been
rejected by the end of the founding era in favor of the moderate
compromise. Still, these positions are consistent with the
internationalist rhetoric of the Restatement (Third)’s various
introductory notes. Given the primacy of international law as a
structure for the conduct of nations and of international relations,
together with the assumption that international law is substantively
progressive, the drafters may have concluded that objections derived
from separation of powers and insistence on certain kinds of democratic
action were hindrances at best and regressive forces at worst.
A similar grudging attitude toward Congress appears in Section
115, which endorses the last-in-time rule. A federal statute will
override a treaty, but only “if the purpose of the act to supersede the
earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or
provision cannot be fairly reconciled.” 162 To some extent, this is
simply an expression of the idea that repeals by implication are
disfavored, and it is also consistent with Section 114’s restatement of
the Charming Betsy canon. 163 Yet Section 115 clearly places the
burden on Congress to establish that legislation overrides a treaty. By
contrast, no such limitations appear on the ability of a treaty to
override a statute; under Section 115(2), the treaty prevails if it is
“inconsistent” with a statute. 164 Thus, although the Restatement
(Third) endorses the equality under U.S. law of federal statutes and
treaties, 165 its one-way presumption suggests a different conclusion. 166
And, again, the reporters’ notes push much further and question
the validity of the last-in-time rule. As to the equality of treaties and

162. Id. § 115(1)(a).
163. See id. § 115 cmt. a (making both points).
164. Neither § 115 nor its comments define “inconsistent.” See also id. cmt. e (raising
concerns about lightly determining that an executive agreement overrides a statute but
expressing no concerns about displacing statutes).
165. Id. § 115 cmt. a; see also id. § 115 reporters’ note 1.
166. The grudging attitude is not directed at Congress alone. Reporters’ Note 3
reluctantly admits that “[t]here is authority for the view that the President has the power,
when acting within his constitutional authority, to disregard a rule of international law or an
agreement of the United States, notwithstanding that international law and agreements are law
of the United States and that it is the President’s duty under the Constitution to ‘take care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.’” See id. § 115 reporters’ note 3.
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statutes, Note 1 observes that “[s]ome have questioned that
inference as unwarranted.” 167 Note 1 also suggests a distinction
between bilateral and multilateral treaties on this issue:
[I]t has been urged that the doctrine should not apply to inconsistency
between a statute and general international law established by a
general multilateral treaty. For that case at least, there have been
suggestions that the United States might better adopt the
jurisprudence of some European countries, which gives effect to an
international agreement even in the face of subsequent legislation. 168

Having planted the seed, Note 1 goes on to admit that last-in-time
doctrine “is established, and a distinction between bilateral and
multilateral agreements has not taken root.” 169 One can almost hear
the whispered “yet” at the end of the sentence.
The introductory note to Part III, on international agreements,
continues the internationalist tone when it stresses the growth of
international agreements and multilateral treaties, which have
“assumed a larger place in the life of the international community of
states and in international law.” 170 The introductory note takes
account of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and
accepts it “as, in general, constituting a codification of the customary
international law governing international agreements, and therefore
as foreign relations law of the United States even though the United
States has not adhered to the Convention.” 171
Section 302(2) addresses the permissible scope of international
agreements under U.S. law, and it departs from the Restatement
(Second): the United States may make an international agreement so
long as it does not “contravene any of the prohibitions or limitations
of the Constitution applicable to the exercise of authority by the

167. Id. § 115 reporters’ note 1.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 144.
171. Id. at 145. The State Department continues to take the same position. See
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited June 10, 2015) (“The United
States considers many of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to
constitute customary international law on the law of treaties.”). For a discussion of the
relationship between the Vienna Convention and the Restatements, see Galbraith, supra note
82.
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United States.” 172 Comment c makes clear the rejection of the
Restatement (Second)’s requirement that international agreements
deal with “matters of international concern.” 173 Comments d and e
observe that there are no federalism or separation of powers
limitations on the ability to make international agreements. 174 The
corollary to Section 302 is Section 303’s assertion of a broad
presidential power to make treaties, congressional-executive
agreements on “any matter that falls within the powers of Congress
and of the President under the Constitution,” and executive
agreements “dealing with any matter that falls within his
independent powers under the Constitution.” 175 The comments
reinforce the breadth of presidential power, first, by observing that
the President’s treaty power is not limited by the enumerated powers
of Congress and, second, by citing Article II’s Vesting Clause and
Hamilton’s Pacificus pamphlets as support. 176
When it comes to the institutional structure for interpreting
international agreements, the Restatement (Third) is close to the

172. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 302(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1986); see also id. § 301 (defining an “international agreement” as
“an agreement between two or more states or international organizations that is intended to
be legally binding and is governed by international law,” with no mention of subject
matter limitations).
173. Id. § 302 cmt. c; see also BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 64 (suggesting the change was
made to eliminate the risk that the “international concern” requirement would prevent human
rights treaties on the ground that they regulate internal matters). Note that the Restatement
(Second) took the position that human rights treaties addressed a topic of
international concern.
174. See id. § 302 cmts. d, e.
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 303 (AM. LAW INST. 1986).
176. See id. § 303 cmts. c, g. And yet again, the reporters’ notes push farther. While
Note 9 admits “the special role of the House of Representatives in raising of revenue” as a
basis for congressional-executive agreements relating to “[t]ariffs and other trade matters,”
Note 7 suggests a much broader power: “the authority to make a Congressional-executive
agreement may be broader than the sum of the respective powers of Congress and the
President; that in international matters the President and Congress together have all the
powers of the United States inherent in its sovereignty and nationhood, and they can therefore
make any international agreement on any subject.” Id. § 303, reporters’ notes 7, 9. Although
these statements find a place for Congress (so long as it translates into more overall authority
to make international law), Note 12 advocates for presidential power, declaring that executive
power to make agreements includes matters that fall within concurrent authority of the
President and Congress. See id. § 303 reporters’ note 2 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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Second. The President interprets international agreements for the
purpose of foreign relations; courts have final authority to interpret
international agreements in judicial proceedings; but courts will
“give great weight to an interpretation made by the Executive
Branch.” 177 The Restatement (Third) maintains the ambiguity about
which executive interpretations receive great weight, although the
reporters’ notes resolve that issue in favor of the judiciary for
interpretations made in the course of litigation. 178
Finally, the Restatement (Third) differs slightly from the Second
with respect to the validity and termination of treaties. Section
331(2)(a) follows the Vienna Convention by providing that a treaty
is void if made by force or threat of force in violation of the UN
Charter or if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of international
law. 179 This section is simultaneously consistent with the Grotian
180
tradition (although not with Grotius himself ) and with Machiavelli
181
(on this issue ). And, in addition to accepting that changed
circumstances can be the basis for treaty termination (and differing
from the Restatement (Second) in concluding that this is an issue of
termination, not interpretation), 182 the Restatement (Third) also
accepts presidential power to terminate because of a violation or
“supervening events” 183 while suggesting that Congress “might
perhaps claim a voice in the termination of a treaty where
termination might create serious danger of war.” 184

177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 326 (AM. LAW INST. 1986).
178. See id. § 326 reporters’ note 2 (“Courts are more likely to defer to an Executive
interpretation previously made in diplomatic negotiation with other countries, on the ground
that the United States should speak with one voice, than to one adopted by the Executive in
relation to a case before the courts, especially where individual rights or interests
are involved.”).
179. See id. § 331(2)(a); see also id. § 331, cmt. d (distinguishing “consent achieved by
force that was privileged under the Charter, for example, if the victim of aggression, acting in
self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter, defeats and imposes a treaty upon the aggressor”).
180. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
182. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 336 & cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1986).
183. Id. § 339(b).
184. Id. § 339 cmt. a; see also id. (suggesting the Senate could give its advice and
consent “on condition that the President shall not terminate the treaty without the consent of
Congress or of the Senate”). The Restatement (Third)’s inclusion of Congress (whether or not
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What is the political theory of treaties in the Restatement
(Third)? To some extent, the answer depends on how seriously one
takes the reporters’ notes, for their internationalist vision is plainly
impatient with the structural arrangements of a federal republic and
the inefficiencies, messy compromises, and reactionary risks of
democratic politics. Even without the reporters’ notes, the
Restatement (Third) remains an internationalist document, with the
result that it focuses on international society and an international
rule of law (both Grotian positions, at least according to Hersch
Lauterpacht 185). It seeks to check and perhaps diminish national
sovereignty by subordinating it to binding international law that
inserts itself into domestic law. Within domestic political frameworks,
it looks with greater favor on executive (and to some extent judicial)
power than it does on legislative power.
Treaties and, especially, international conventions are a key tool
for advancing these goals. Thus, treaty law must function in a way
that allows treaties to fulfill that purpose, or, failing that, in a way
that hinders those goals as little as possible. As a result, the
Restatement (Second)’s post-Bricker effort to balance is gone, but the
effort to exorcise Bricker’s ghost leads the Restatement (Third) away
from the founding era compromises as well. 186 Hamiltonian
Federalism gains significant strength.
The political theory of the Restatement (Third) also includes an
explicit embrace of international human rights. Its elevation of
international law over domestic law and politics aids this goal. If
international law is enforceable domestic law, then so are
international human rights, and, like other rights, they should
operate as trumps over ordinary laws and policies. Of course, the
Restatement (Third) stops short of this position for treaties because
it has to recognize the reality of reservations, understandings, and
declarations. Yet this accommodation should not obscure a deeper
point. To the extent the Restatement (Third) embraces executive
authority as the means to the internationalist end (and to the extent
reluctant) comes closer than the Restatement (Second) to historical practice. See Curtis A.
Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773, 788–801 (2014).
185. See Lauterpacht, supra note 15; see also Koh, supra note 3, at 2606 (claiming the
foundational importance of Grotius’s conception of international society).
186. Cf. Ernest A. Young, Treaties as “Part of our Law,” 88 TEX. L. REV. 91, 94 (2009)
(criticizing internationalists for privileging international law).
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that the executive branch will have institutional advantages over the
judiciary), it also creates risks.
First, the welter of international law and relations agendas might
undermine or stall the advancement of individual rights and values
associated with them, such as transparency. 187 Second, a strong
executive may have little interest in pursuing a human rights agenda
and might prefer to use international law in a manner consistent with
national interests. Third, domestic institutions may not give in
quietly to the internationalist agenda. The result could be—and
arguably has been—the occasional endorsement of human rights at
the diplomatic level while consigning their enforcement to the
domestic politics that the Restatement (Third) disdains. 188
The Restatement (Third) thus risks working at cross-purposes,
particularly with respect to the making and implementation of
treaties. That risk, in turn, represents the continued and perhaps
necessary difficulties of political theories that approach international
relations from a legal perspective, that conceive of treaties as, in part,
a lever to advance domestic policy goals, and that are impatient with
internal structural issues.
C. The Draft Restatement (Fourth): Governance 189
After the excesses (however well-intentioned) of the Restatement
(Third), and particularly the tone of its reporters’ notes, the project
to draft a Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law is liberating.
It marks the Restatement (Third), although nominally still in effect,
as a document in time and increasingly of the past. The Restatement
(Third) is history; the Restatement (Fourth) will take over the task of
suggesting the future. Although doctrinal sources are much more
187. Cf. SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO
GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES 174–84 (2006) (arguing that globalization exacerbates a trend toward
centralizing domestic power in the executive branch, primarily at the expense of Congress, and
that this process corresponds with an increase in secrecy and control of information as well as a
“democratic deficit”).
188. The stakes in the prolonged academic and judicial battles over self-execution
doctrine under or despite the Restatement (Third) bring this point home.
189. With respect to treaties, the Restatement (Fourth) project so far has produced, in
order, three preliminary drafts, a discussion draft, and a fourth preliminary draft. Unless
otherwise noted, this section addresses the provisions of the fourth preliminary draft,
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
TREATIES (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
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numerous now than when the ALI began its foreign relations project
sixty years ago, many of the actual doctrinal rules remain in flux. The
controversies surrounding doctrinal development have fostered an
immense increase in the breadth and depth of foreign relations law
scholarship. Drawing on these materials, the new Restatement
inevitably will suggest new possibilities for foreign relations law.
As they embarked on this project, therefore, the reporters
confronted the question of how ambitious they should be. Initially,
the answer appears to be, not very. And with good reason. The
Restatement (Third) was ambitious, but the final product reflected
the tensions and, in some instances, the failures of that ambition.190
Yet if one rejects the Restatement (Third) as a model, then it
becomes possible to see the Restatement (Fourth) reporters as
ambitious in a different way.
Instead of the cautious pragmatism of the Restatement (Second)
or the ideological assertiveness of the Restatement (Third), the drafts
of the Restatement (Fourth) present foreign relations law as
something normal. For the draft Restatement (Fourth), international
law is law, and it interacts with the U.S. legal system in myriad ways.
There is no need for caution, but also no need for affirmations of
faith and headlong embraces. Instead, the drafts engage
professionally with the tricky legal issues that go along with
determining how (not whether) international law functions as law,
particularly as it interacts with a dualist liberal presidential
democracy. They also recognize that foreign relations and
international law are part of larger domestic and global frameworks
of institutions and practices.
The problems that the Restatement (Fourth) intends to address,
191
in short, are problems of governance, not ideology. For example,

190. See supra note 125. The draft Restatement (Fourth)’s Reporters’ Memorandum on
the Definition of Foreign Relations Law (Dec. 2013) contains muted criticism of the
Restatement (Third), particularly with respect to its assertions about international law. See
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
JURISDICTION reporters’ memorandum (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 1, 2013).
191. A World Bank web page on the Middle East and North Africa provides a useful
definition of “governance”:
Conceptually, governance (as opposed to “good” governance) can be defined as the
rule of the rulers, typically within a given set of rules. One might conclude that
governance is the process – by which authority is conferred on rulers, by which they
make the rules, and by which those rules are enforced and modified. Thus,
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the draft materials on treaties do not discuss, whether to condemn
(as in the Restatement (Third)) or to praise, the rational choice (or
realist) approach to international law, for example as recently
192
The draft
espoused by Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner.
understanding governance requires an identification of both the rulers and the rules,
as well as the various processes by which they are selected, defined, and linked
together and with the society generally.
Nonetheless, within this concept of governance, the obvious second question is:
What is good governance? Again, the debate on the quality of governance has been
clouded by a slew of slightly differing definitions and understanding of what is actually
meant by the term. Typically, it is defined in terms of the mechanisms thought to be
needed to promote it. For example, in various places, good governance has been
associated with democracy and good civil rights, with transparency, with the rule of
law, and with efficient public services.
What is Governance?, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/
MENAEXT/EXTMNAREGTOPGOVERNANCE/0,,contentMDK:20513159~pagePK:
34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:497024,00.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2015); see also
MICHAEL BARNETT & RAYMOND DUVALL, Power in Global Governance, in POWER AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005) (“Governance
involves the rules, structures, and institutions that guide, regulate, and control social life . . . .
Scholars and policymakers regularly address questions of who governs, how institutions might
be designed to check the potential abuse of power, and how individual autonomy and liberty
can be preserved.”).
Governance also has an international component. As Barnett & Duvall explain, “global
governance” is a technocratic, somewhat chastened successor to internationalism. It reflects the
goal that
states and peoples [will] be able to cooperate on economic, environmental, security,
and political issues, settle their disputes in a nonviolent manner, and advance their
common interests and values. Absent an adequate supply of global governance,
states are likely to retreat behind protective barriers and re-create the conditions for
enduring conflict. Global governance, then, is thought to bring out the best in the
international community and rescue it from its worst instincts.
Id. at 1. Governance, global governance, and the associated idea of globalization have also
spurred an extensive and insightful critical literature. See, e.g., id., at 2 (arguing governance
implicates “fundamental elements of power”); CRITICAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE (Gráinne de Búrca et al. eds., 2014); see also FOUCAULT, supra note 32.
In this Article, I use the word “governance” to indicate an effort to combine the rule of
law and transparency with a more technocratic concern for the frameworks within which
political, legal, and bureaucratic actors make decisions and develop policies.
192. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
7–10, 14–17, 180 (2005) (describing their use of rational choice theory as an instrumental
approach and distinguishing traditional “realism” from their research agenda). For criticism of
this approach, see, for example, O’CONNELL, supra note 43; JENS DAVID OHLIN, THE
ASSAULT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015); and Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits
of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1270 (2006) (“The vision of international law
that Goldsmith and Posner espouse, though newly dressed up in the trappings of rational
choice theory and econometric analysis, is at bottom just the same old realist vision.”).
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Restatement (Fourth), like its predecessors, undoubtedly sees
international obligations, once made, as legally binding as a matter of
domestic law. The concerns of realism nonetheless coexist with the
draft Restatement (Fourth) as political reasons for entering into or
complying with international obligations (which, to the extent this is
an accurate characterization, may be more of an accommodation for
193
realism than one finds in the Restatement (Third)). Further, to the
extent the draft Restatement (Fourth) has a governance focus, it
arguably sidesteps the debate over realism by, instead, recognizing
and making room for international law as a blend of hard and soft
194
law in its own right and as it operates within domestic law.
Interestingly, the draft Restatement (Fourth)’s governance focus and
arguable coexistence with realism likely will produce a document that
is friendlier to the structure and practices of democracy than was the
Restatement (Third). 195
Because the material on treaties is incomplete, the rest of this
196
discussion will necessarily be tentative. But the difference in tone
from the Restatement (Third) emerges immediately. For example,
193. See infra notes 247–49 and accompanying text (suggesting further aspects of
this observation).
194. Cf. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000). Goldsmith & Posner compare and contrast their
views with the institutionalism of scholars such as Abbott & Snidal. See GOLDSMITH &
POSNER, supra note 192, at 16–17, 83–106.
195. Cf. supra note 191 (noting that governance concerns typically include democracy
and transparency). This Article does not analyze other parts of the Restatement (Fourth)
project (let alone the predecessor sections of those projects in the Restatement (Second) and
Restatement (Third)). Still, some of the other Restatement (Fourth) materials are consistent
with a governance approach. The reporters have taken pains to point out that, unlike the
Restatement (Third), they are trying to delineate clearly “the distinction between domestic
policy and practice, on the one hand, and international law, on the other.” RESTATEMENT
(FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: JURISDICTION
reporters’ memorandum at xv (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 1, 2013); see also
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY reporters’ memorandum at xxiii (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No.
1, 2015) (“Our general approach to the topic is the same as that taken by the Restatement
Third, although we have endeavored to draw a clearer distinction between domestic and
international law . . . .”). They have also stressed their effort to be “straightforward” and
“fair” in their accounts of U.S. law. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: JURISDICTION reporters’ memorandum at xv (AM.
LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2014).
196. I intend my discussion to be much more descriptive and analytical than normative.
For what it is worth, I disagree with aspects of the draft Restatement (Fourth), but my overall
reaction is favorable.
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Sections 102 and 104 focus on international law, and although they
assert positions that are roughly consistent with the Restatement
197
(Third), they do so without rhetoric. Section 102(1) asserts the
capacity of “[e]very state, including the United States . . . to
198
conclude international agreements,” which “includes, but is not
limited to, a ‘treaty’ as that term is understood in U.S. domestic
199
law.” Section 102(3) links with Section 101(3) to stress that
domestic law is not a justification for “failure to perform an
international agreement”—unless the rule at issue is “domestic law
of fundamental importance concerning competence to conclude
200
Section 104 addresses the
international agreements.”
circumstances under which an international agreement “enters into
201
force as an international obligation for a state.” For both sections,
the comments and reporters’ notes make clear the conscious effort
by the reporters to invoke provisions of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. By linking itself with the Vienna Convention,
the draft also links itself, at least initially, to the basic framework for
enabling the treaty and convention-based aspects of global
governance projects. More generally, these materials also provide a
useful overview of international standards and aspects of U.S. law.
And in stark contrast with the Restatement (Third), the reporters do
all of this without sweeping assertions about the structure of the
international community or about the nature of international law or
its status in the U.S. legal system.
Section 106, on treaty interpretation, is a mix of international
and domestic law. Perhaps most significantly, the comments and
reporters’ notes assert the status of the Vienna Convention as

197. For both sections, the reporters have chosen to address international agreements in
general, but they stress that these sections do not address “the domestic status of international
agreements other than Article II treaties.” See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 102 n.† (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary
Draft No. 4, 2015); id. § 104 n.†.
198. Id. § 102.
199. Id. § 102 cmt. a.
200. Id. § 102(3). For discussion of § 101, see infra notes 211–12 and
accompanying text.
201. Id. § 104(1). It appears that there will also be a § 104A that states international law
on “reservations and other conditions,” which will provide a bridge from § 104 to § 105 (on
U.S. law with respect to reservations). See id. at xvii.
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customary international law. 202 According to the reporters, the first
four sections of Section 106 directly reflect the provisions of Articles
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. As Comment c obliquely
explains, the decision to rely on the Vienna Convention is a gentle
nudge to the federal courts: “The Supreme Court has rarely cited the
Vienna Convention when interpreting treaties, but it has generally
applied criteria that are consistent with those set forth in the Vienna
203
Convention.” Taken together Sections 102, 104, and 106(1)-(4)
indicate that the draft Restatement (Fourth) is consistent with, even if
not necessarily advocating for, the general project of
204
global governance.
The comments and notes to Section 106 also address U.S. law
and practice. For example, Comment g notes—but does not
explicitly endorse in full—the use by U.S. courts of domestic legal
205
materials as an aid to treaty interpretation. Although use of these
materials “runs the risk of establishing a meaning of the treaty for
one state that is not shared by other states parties,” they “may be
particularly relevant” in some circumstances, including the issue of
206
This passage is consistent with the Discussion
self-execution.
Draft’s discussion of self-execution, although I believe it is flawed in
its over-endorsement of the intent theory for determining whether a
207
treaty is self-executing. Even so, the discussion of this issue is clear,
informative, and useful.
Section 106(5) turns explicitly to U.S. law. It provides that,
although “Courts of the United States have final authority to
interpret a treaty for purposes of applying it as law in the United
202. Id. § 106, cmt. a & reporters’ notes 1, 9; see also supra note 171 (noting the State
Department takes the same general position about the status of the Vienna Convention).
203. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015); see also id.
reporters’ note 2 (making the same point and noting that some courts of appeals have explicitly
relied on the Vienna Convention).
204. Cf. Sadat, supra note 125, at 1687 (observing that the proposal for a fourth
restatement “was premised on the need for increased international cooperation and crisis
management due to the pressures of globalization” but expressing concern, based on the
provisions so far, that “its impact, if not its objective, . . . will arguably undercut
[those] goals”).
205. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
206. Id.; see also id. § 106, reporters’ note 7.
207. See supra note 150.
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States, . . . they will ordinarily give great weight to an interpretation
208
by the executive branch.” Comment h provides some additional
explanation for this “traditional” statement by the Supreme Court,
but Reporters’ Note 8 provides a more complicated picture when it
observes that the Court “at times has declined to follow the
interpretation of the executive branch, sometimes without citing the
209
‘great weight’ standard.” One could read these comments as a
deliberate step away from endorsement of a practice that the
210
reporters feel compelled to recognize.
The rest of the draft provisions deal directly with U.S. law rather
than international law, but they continue the focus on governance.
Section 101 is a confident but straightforward assertion of familiar
black letter law: treaties “made under the authority of the United
States” are the supreme law of the land; cases arising under treaties
are within the judicial power granted to federal courts; treaties are
binding on state courts; and the domestic implementation of treaties
has nothing to do with the binding nature of a treaty as a matter of
international law. 211 The comments are brief, explanatory, and to the
point, and the reporters’ note simply points out how this draft
212
section intersects with the provisions of the Restatement (Third).
213
Section 103 restates U.S. law on approval of treaties. Here, the
comments provide a concise and helpful explanation of negotiation,
advice and consent, and ratification. They briefly explain the power
of the President and the role of the Senate, and the reporters’ notes
take up these issues in greater detail. And here the goals of the draft
Restatement (Fourth) are on full display. Unlike the sketchy
reporters’ notes of the Restatement (Second), or the argumentative
and sometimes destabilizing reporters’ notes of the Restatement
(Third), the reporters’ notes in the draft Restatement (Fourth)
208. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106(5) (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
209. Id. § 106 reporters’ note 8.
210. See Cohen, supra note 82 (arguing the Court no longer gives as much deference to
the executive branch as it once did); Galbraith, supra note 82 (arguing for less deference).
211. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 101 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
212. But see Sadat, supra note 125, at 1680–88 (objecting to the failure to discuss other
international agreements along with treaties).
213. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 103 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
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present what is clear, explain it when necessary or helpful, and then
discuss issues that are complex or ambiguous. Conceptions of good
governance typically rely on transparency and clearly-defined
political structures.
The discussion of the President’s power to negotiate treaties
provides an example of the overall approach. Although the
President’s power to negotiate treaties is exclusive, Reporters’ Notes
2 and 3 carefully explain the power that the Senate and Congress as a
whole retain to participate in, remain informed of, and sometimes
affect those negotiations. 214 At each level, the reader gains greater
depth of understanding of how governmental institutions in the
United States go about the business of creating treaties within and
beyond the reach of legal doctrine. This discussion indicates that
Congress—the most democratic part of the federal government—
often takes an important role beyond the Senate’s advice and
consent responsibilities with respect to the creation of treaties. The
reporters’ notes do not endorse these practices, but their
straightforward description nonetheless tends toward legitimation.
Section 105, following the discussion of international law on a
treaty’s entry into force, addresses the impact in U.S. law of
215
reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs). Consistent
with the second and third Restatements, as well as with longstanding
practice, the draft accepts the legitimacy of RUDs. The comments
frame this as a question of Senate authority pursuant to its advice
and consent power. But Section 105 also seeks to place reasonable
limits on the use of RUDs. It provides that RUDs must “relate to
216
the treaty” (as well as be consistent with the Constitution), and the
comments discuss the limits on RUDs that may be imposed by
217
specific treaties or by the terms of the Vienna Convention. The

214. See id. § 103 reporters’ notes 2, 3.
215. As noted above, a future § 104A will discuss international law on this issue. See
supra note 201.
216. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 105(1) (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
217. Id. § 105 cmt. c. Reporters’ Note 6 discusses the specific issue of declarations about
self-execution or non-self-execution, and it refers to a more extensive discussion in § 110 (the
yet to be released revision of the section on self-execution). The note correctly observes that
this practice has become more common and cites the Supreme Court’s apparent acceptance of
it. It also discusses and dismisses the relevance of Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Fed. Power Comm'n,
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draft’s express recognition of these limits further confirms its goal of
situating U.S. law within global practice where possible.
The comments and reporters’ notes for Section 105 frame the
issue of RUDs as one in which the President and Senate are in
conflict, with the result that the President may refuse to ratify a
treaty based on disagreement with certain reservations. The notes
would be stronger if they mentioned that the executive branch
sometimes proposes RUDs either before or after negotiating with
members of the Senate, and that in at least some instances it appears
that the President might even prefer to ratify a treaty or convention
218
to which the Senate has given only conditional consent.
Section 107 is a stand-alone provision which declares that a
treaty cannot violate individual constitutional rights. 219 No longer is
this topic lumped in with other issues about the scope of the treaty
power. Again, the comments and reporters’ notes provide helpful
detail and assist the reader in understanding the basic aspects of this
issue and the contours of its ambiguities. Reporters’ Note 3 has an
interesting discussion of the extent to which treaty provisions could
create the compelling interest necessary to satisfy the strict scrutiny
test that determines whether some constitutional rights have been
violated. 220 Placed as it is, Section 107 provides an immediate check
on the power to make and implement treaties. Much has changed in
the law of constitutional rights since the Restatement (Second). Not
as much has changed since the Third, but the emphasis of the draft
Restatement (Fourth) is different. There is no need to advocate, even
intermittently, for treaty supremacy. The draft Restatement (Fourth),
instead, deals calmly with the intersection of treaties and
constitutional rights and, in keeping with mainstream domestic
doctrine, the Constitution prevails (even if, as Reporters’ Note 4
observes, potentially difficult issues remain about the validity of the
treaty and U.S. obligations under it). 221
247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957), vacated as moot, 355 U.S. 64 (1957). See supra note 116
(noting the Restatement (Second)’s discussion of the case).
218. Cf. supra note 214 and accompanying text (noting the usefulness of such an
explanation for treaty negotiation).
219. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 107 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
220. See id. § 107 reporters’ note 3.
221. The Discussion Draft deleted a comment from Preliminary Draft No. 3 that
expressly stated a treaty would remain valid as an international obligation even if it called for
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Section 108 is another short provision. It builds on Section 101
to declare that treaties are supreme over state and local law, and that
courts will apply a self-executing treaty provision if there is a conflict
between the treaty and a state or local law. 222 And again, one finds
greater clarity about how different parts of the government—here,
different levels within a federal system—will interact with a treaty.
Because of federal supremacy, states are bound by treaties, and the
issue of self-execution, appearing for the first time, comes into play
only when trying to resolve conflicts between treaties and state or
local law. The clear implication is that a non-self-executing treaty
provision remains the supreme law of the land, which is a significant
difference from the Restatement (Second) and possibly from the
Restatement (Third). 223 Reporters’ Note 3 supports that implication
when it observes that, although state courts are not obligated to
apply a non-self-executing treaty or treaty provision, “[s]tate and
local courts may be able to promote compliance with a non-selfexecuting treaty obligation through their application of State or
local law.” 224

violation of constitutional rights. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 103 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No.
3, 2014). That issue now appears in Reporters’ Note 4 with slightly different language (it now
states that the United States “likely would remain obligated” under such a treaty). See
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH): TREATIES OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 103 reporters’ note 4 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015);
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
TREATIES § 107 reporters’ note 4 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
222. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 108 reporters’ note 4 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
223. See supra notes 140–50. Here again, a comment in Preliminary Draft No. 3, on the
question whether there is a presumption against preemption (and suggesting there is no
presumption), see RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 104 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2014), has
been moved to the reporters’ notes. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 104 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft 2015); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 108 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4,
2015). For the argument in favor of a presumption against preemption of state law by treaties,
see David H. Moore, Treaties and the Presumption against Preemption, 2015 BYU L. REV.
1556 (2016).
224. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 104 reporters’ note 3, at 19 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft, 2015).
For discussions of this dynamic, see Janet Koven Levit, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon: The Glass is
Half Full, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29 (2007); Nancy Alexander, Comment, Saved by the
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Section 109 addresses the last-in-time rule. It backs away from
the Restatement (Third)’s imbalanced approach in favor of a simple
set of rules: courts should interpret federal statutes to avoid conflicts
with treaties; if there is a conflict, the last-in-time rule applies; and
the international law obligation remains even if trumped by a statute
for purposes of U.S. law. 225 The comments and reporters’ notes make
clear the pedigree of the rule in Supreme Court case law. Although
they make no effort to undermine it (unlike the reporters’ notes in
the Restatement (Third)), they also make no attempt to explain or
justify its existence. It simply is the rule. On this topic, the reporters
would do better to attempt a justification for the rule as well. For
example, they could cite the discussion of the last-in-time rule in the
1815–16 congressional debates that also addressed self-execution
and the powers of Congress to implement (or impede) treaties. 226
Interestingly, Reporters’ Note 2 discusses a presumption against
conflict when interpreting a statute, 227 although it does not provide a
clear rule to describe the strength of this presumption, and it does
not endorse the Restatement (Third) approach that required
evidence that the purpose of the statute was to override a treaty
obligation. On this point, the draft Restatement (Fourth) brings
statutes and treaties closer to the equality that they find in Supreme
Court opinions (equality, but with rules of construction to avoid
conflict). Note 2 goes on, however, to extend the presumption
against conflict to non-self-executing treaties:
Because this canon of construction is based in part on the
assumption that Congress does not lightly violate the international
obligations established by a treaty, it presumably applies to
potential conflicts with both self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties. After all, the distinction between self-executing and nonself-executing treaties concerns only domestic enforceability and

States? The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Federal Government Shortcomings, and
Oregon’s Rescue, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 819 (2011).
225. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 109 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
226. See Parry, supra note 45, at 1305–16; see also Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A
Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319 (2005).
227. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 109 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
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does not typically affect the international obligations of the United
States under a treaty. 228

This note plainly reinforces the clear implication from Section 108
that, unlike the Restatement (Second) and possibly unlike the
Restatement (Third), a non-self-executing treaty is supreme law of
the land.
Despite the importance of the previous sections, the legal issues
relating to the distinction between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties may be even more significant. The reporters
discussed self-execution in Section 106 of Preliminary Draft No. 3
and the Discussion Draft, but that section does not appear in
Preliminary Draft No. 4 (although a place has been held for it as
Section 110). Presumably in response to comments and criticism, the
229
reporters are still working on a revision. In the meantime, the
language from the Discussion Draft provides plenty of fodder
for analysis.
Former Section 106 provides a simple and logical analysis of selfexecution (which was a change from the first effort to address selfexecution in Preliminary Draft No. 2). First, a self-executing treaty
provision is enforceable by the judiciary, while compliance with a
non-self-executing provision “may be achieved through judicial
application of preexisting or newly enacted law, or through
230
executive, administrative, or other action outside the courts.”
Second, the decision whether a provision is self-executing turns on
the intent or understanding of the “U.S. treatymakers” or on a
231
statement in the Senate’s resolution of advice and consent. Third,
a treaty provision is non-self-executing if the Constitution requires
implementing legislation. 232
The comments in the Discussion Draft flesh out this analysis. As
had the Restatement (Third), Comment b notes that self-execution is
distinct from whether the treaty creates private rights and

228. Id. (internal citation omitted).
229. See id. at xv.
230. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106(1) (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015).
231. Id. § 106(2).
232. Id. § 106(3). As should be clear from the text, I appreciate the Reporters’ ability to
navigate this issue whether or not I agree with all of their analysis. Cf. supra note 150.
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remedies. 233 It also repeats the assertion that the executive branch
may be able to enforce a treaty even if the courts cannot—an issue
that raises interesting questions and potential concerns that
subsequent drafts presumably will address. 234 Comment d provides
that the text and purpose of the treaty play a large role in
determining the intent of the treaty makers. 235 Comment e stresses
that there is no presumption against or in favor of self-execution,
which resolves a concern that has existed since the Supreme Court’s
discussion of self-execution in Medellín v. Texas. 236 Comment f
provides further information about Senate statements in the advice
and consent resolution, and it suggests that courts should defer to
these statements whether the statements are in favor of self-execution
or against it. 237
The reporters’ notes for Section 106 in the Discussion Draft are
longer and more argumentative than the notes to the other draft
sections in Preliminary Draft No. 4, and they underscore the
importance of self-execution. Unlike the Restatement (Third)’s
notes, however, the argument is not with existing doctrine; nor is it
an effort to establish a normative position. Instead, the scholarly
debate that began in the late 1990s, the subsequent decision in
Medellín, and the often-critical scholarly commentary that Medellín
has inspired, all forced the reporters to wade into the fray and
provide some guideposts.
Reporters’ Note 1 recognizes the constitutional and policy
arguments in favor of self-execution, but it downplays the
233. See id. § 106 cmt. b. Exactly what this distinction means in practice is sometimes
unclear. See Parry, supra note 150, at 63–71.
234. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015); see also id. § 106
reporters’ note 1 at 31; id. § 106 reporters’ note 6 at 45–46. For discussion of this issue, see
supra notes 65–67 (discussing the congressional debate over the extradition of Jonathan
Robbins); see also Jensen, supra note 137.
235. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015).
236. Id. § 106 cmt. e; see Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); BRADLEY, supra note
74, at 47 (discussing this issue); Parry, supra note 150, at 60 (also discussing this issue); see also
Sloss, supra note 108, at 1741–44 (suggesting the more fruitful question is whether
presumptions are context-specific); Vázquez, supra note 150 (arguing there is sometimes a
presumption in favor of self-execution).
237. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015).
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importance of judicial enforcement in light of the many other
avenues that may exist for enforcement. It also highlights the
“political, legal, and administrative considerations that sometimes
make it preferable that a treaty not become law in the United States
until it is implemented by Congress.” 238 Note 1 goes on to discuss
Medellín in an interesting way by describing the Court’s reasoning as
a kind of field guide for issues that courts should consider when
deciding the self-execution question. 239 Note 2 then expressly
discusses factors that courts should address, drawn from numerous
cases (with Medellín playing essentially a supporting role). The views
of the executive branch on this issue, according to Note 2, have
great importance. 240
Medellín comes in for rougher treatment in Reporters’ Notes 3
and 6. First, Note 3, when discussing whether there is a presumption
in favor of or against self-execution, asserts that Medellín did not
change the law and that “[t]he unusual circumstances of Medellín
. . . further counsels against generalizing too much from the Court’s
finding there of non-self-execution.” 241 Then, Note 6 undermines
the Medellín majority’s suggestion that non-self-executing treaty
provisions are not supreme law of the land; it characterizes this part
of the opinion as “ambiguous on this issue” while also suggesting
the case should be read narrowly because “the Court was focused in
that case only on whether the relevant treaties were judicially
enforceable.” 242 For the reporters, Medellín is, at best, just another
case, and it should not receive special consideration beyond its
specific context.
Reporters’ Note 5 is also interesting. Addressing the question of
when Congress has exclusive power to legislate, the note finds no clear

238. Id. § 106 reporters’ note 1 at 31; see also id. § 106, cmt. b. Reporters’ Note 6
revisits this issue as well. Id. § 106 reporters’ note 6, at 45–46.
239. Id. § 106 reporters’ note 1, at 34–35.
240. See id. § 106 reporters’ note 2.
241. Id. § 106 reporters’ note 3.
242. Id. § 106 reporters’ note 6, at 45; see also Vázquez, supra note 150, at 1747
(noting the draft’s treatment of Medellín avoids “the blind alleys down which [that decision]
might have led them” and “rightly recognize[s] that some of the views expressed in the
opinion are untenable”). Cf. John T. Parry, Rewriting the Roberts Court’s Law of Treaties, 88
TEX. L. REV. 65, 67–69 (2010) (suggesting supporters of the Medellín decision have had to
“rewrite” it so that it can make sense), http://www.texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/
seealso/vol88/pdf/88TexasLRevSeeAlso65.pdf.
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guidance but observes, first, that most congressional powers are not
exclusive and, second, that these issues play out in complicated ways in
practice. 243 By the end of the note, self-executing treaties come away
with greater ability to impact congressional prerogatives than the
Restatement (Third) contemplated. Here, one finds a hint of the
Restatement (Third)’s impatience with the messiness of the democratic
give and take, but the analysis turns more on “U.S. treaty practice,”
“structural considerations[,] and customary practice.” 244
Finally, Reporters’ Note 7 criticizes the Restatement (Third) for
suggesting a non-self-executing treaty is not the supreme law of the
land, and it faults the earlier Restatement’s reporters’ notes for
suggesting that failure to implement a treaty indicates that the treaty
is self-executing. 245 That is to say, the flaw of the Restatement (Third)
was, first, attempting to push for judicial enforcement as the norm
for treaties (and perhaps simply failing to recognize other
enforcement options) and, second, being ambiguous on a key issue
of enforcement. So far, at least, ambiguity is not the flaw of the draft
Restatement (Fourth), perhaps because ambiguity translates into a
failure to provide clear structures for governance.
Overall, the draft Restatement (Fourth) shies away from an overt
or immediately recognizable political theory of treaties. With a new
draft of the self-execution section on the horizon and several critical
issues remaining— including executive power to implement treaties
and the law relating to other kinds of international agreements—a
more active theory may yet emerge. For now, however, the
preference for clarity and structure over theory underscores the draft
Restatement (Fourth)’s governance agenda. In the process, the draft
provisions tend overall toward a meaningful role for Congress even
as they also confirm strong executive power. More generally, the
political branches appear to gain power while the judiciary loses
some ground (albeit with important caveats).
Yet the absence of overt theorizing, or perhaps simply the
decision not to be as aggressive on that front as the Restatement
(Third), does not mean that the Restatement (Fourth)’s Discussion
Draft for treaties has no political theory. Governance is about
243. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH): TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 5 at 42–44 (AM.
LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015).
244. Id.
245. See id. § 106 reporters’ note 7 at 46–47.
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structures within which accountable political institutions play their
defined roles and administrators exercise their sound discretion to
fulfill policy objectives, with legal rules and courts providing an
246
important set of constraints. Legal doctrines work best under this
approach when they are relatively clear and result in discernable
expectations and incentives, or when they mark out general
structures or parameters within which institutions may operate,
possibly differentiate, and perhaps innovate. From the domestic
perspective, international law fits best within this model either when
it creates clear and discrete rules that will function as law, or when it
provides outlines for exercises of discretion and political choice that
are largely outside the realm of the courts.
When the new Restatement provisions mark off what is judicially
enforceable from what is not, or when they define what is part of
foreign relations law and what is not, they create legal and non-legal
spaces that together will shape the doctrines and practices of foreign
relations law. 247 Although the current draft is by no means a realist
document, its precision and governance focus, if carried through to
the final version, will define large areas in which discretionary policy
decisions will meet with few hard legal constraints. 248 The
Restatement (Third), by contrast, was uncomfortable with this
approach to international law and relations.
Unlike the Restatement (Third), the drafts of the Fourth do not
opine on whether there is an international society out there (whether
or not it is anarchical) or whether foreign relations play out in a
Machiavellian or Hobbesian space. The drafts assume some level of
global governance but appear agnostic about its strength and scope.
But whatever the nature of and relationship among international
society and international relations, the Restatement (Fourth)
inevitably will contribute to the scope and definition of that

246. See supra note 191 (defining governance).
247. See FLEUR JOHNS, NON-LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNRULY LAW 1, 9
(2013) (arguing for the importance of understanding the importance of “non-law” that
“stands opposed to or outside the reach of legal norms” in categories such as “the before, the
after, the below, the above, the against and the despite”).
248. Cf. supra note 191. Indeed, it is possible to define the draft, not as realist, but
rather, in its governance focus, as reflecting raison d’état in its more complex and arguably
positive sense. See supra notes 32, 38.
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relationship and to the breadth or narrowness of the role that
domestic and international law play within it. 249
CONCLUSION
The goal of this article has been to suggest ways in which the law
of treaties has interacted with European and North American
political theory over the past 400 years. Theories from early modern
Europe continue to be relevant for framing many aspects of treaty
law and political theory. The U.S. founding era became an important
site for the interplay of these theories. In future decades,
commentators may see the American Law Institute’s three projects
on foreign relations law—situated during the period in which the
U.S. emerged, sometimes stumbled, and was increasingly challenged
as a dominant (sometimes, the dominant) force in world affairs—as a
similar moment.
The impacts that result from the intersection between the
Restatements and political theories, and the significance of those
impacts, are undoubtedly both important and subject to debate. But
to have that debate at all, these issues must first, as this article
attempts to demonstrate, be an object of study.

249. Arguably, a governance approach will result in superior substantive results,
including in those areas marked by discretionary policy decisions rather than legal doctrine.
This Article takes no position on whether the Restatement (Fourth) or one of its predecessors
would best contribute to superior substantive results.
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